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ABSTRACT
The health and safety analysis presented is this document is part of an
overall effo-t to iden:ify and develop innovative underground coal extraction
systems. The single-entry tunnel borer system was initially considered an
innovative approach to underground mining because it exhibited a means of
increasing the speed and efficiency of entry development by reducing the
number of entries. However, to be considered a truly advanced system, the
tunnel borer had to meet distinct safety criteria as well. The objective was
to examine the tunnel borer design and determine whether it offset major
health hazards, and satisfied the prescribed safety levels. As a baseline for
comparison, the tunnel borer was compared against the continuous mining entry
driving system.
The results of the health analysis indicated that while the tunnel borer
design offered improvements in dust control through the use of water sprays, a
higher face ventilation rate, and the application of spalling rather than the
conventional grinding process, it interjected an additional mutagen and toxic
compound into the environment through the use of shotcrete.
The tunnel borer system easily conformed with the prescribed fatality
limit, but exceeded the required limits for disabling and overall injuries. It
also exhibited projected disabling and overall injury rates considerably
higher than existing continuous mining injury rates. Consequently, the tunnel
borer system was not considered an advanced system.
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VFOREWORD
The JPL Advanced Coal Extraction Systems Definition Project is part of a
program to develop advanced mineral extraction systems. This project focuses
on five major areas:
(1) Planning and Management
(2) Systems Definition
(3) Concept Development
(4) Techn3logy Assessment
(5) Systems Analysis
This document, which provides the results of a health and safety analysis
conducted on a single-entry ti.nnel boring concept, is the product of a subtask
defined under the Svstems Analvsis area. The work was sponsored by the Office
of Mining, United States Department of Energy, through ;i interagcncy agree-
ment, No. DE-AI01-76 ET12548, with the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration (Task RD 152, Amendment 90). William B. Schmidt, Director of the
Office of Mining, is the project officer.
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GLOSSARY
Definition of Symbols
B j The historical aggregate number of yearly body injuries 	 for a
given accident class j,	 associated with a conventional	 design used
as a comparison against a protective	 feature of a new design.
b j The aggregate projected yearly body injuries in a given accident
class	 j,	 for a new design.
dj The	 fractional adjustment	 in injuries of a given accident	 class	 j,
based on the consensus of a group of experts pertaining to a new
protective device.
f i The	 fractional change in the labor force	 for a given	 task i,
between a new design and an analogous conventional comparison.
g i The	 fractional adjustment	 in injuries	 for a given	 task i,	 based on
the consensus of a group of experts pertaining to a new design.
N i The historical yearly injuries	 associated with a given	 task i,	 of
an analogous conventional system used as a comparison against a
new design.
n i The projected yearly injuries	 for	 a given	 task i,	 of a new design.
t i
	The time (hours) exposed to a given hazard for a task i, as
performed in a new design.
T i
	The time (hours) exposed to a given hazard for a task i, as
performed in a conventional system used as a comparison against a
new design.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY .
A. OBJECTIVE
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Advanced Coal Extraction Systems
Definition Project, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office
of Mining, was established to define and develop innovative underground coal
extraction systems s •,itable for the significant resources remaining it the
year 2000. The development of a single-entry tunnel boring system appears to
have attractive ground control characteristics in comparison to convectional
room and pillar roof support systems, and also exhibits a means of increasing
the speed and e!ficiency of entry development by reducing the number of
entries. These attributes sake the tunnel borer a prime candidate as an
advanced system. In addition to these assets, a new system such as the tunnel
borer must also demonstrate a potential to reduce miner disabling injuries and
fatalities to levels comparable to other heavy industries which have similar
hazards. Similar industries such as construction, primary metal manufacturing,
metal and non-metal mining, and petroleum extraction exhibit trends toward 0.2
fatalities per million manhours, 30 disabling injuries per million manhours,
and 40 to 45 averall injuries per million manhours. These injury levels
represent the safety requirement for new designs under the guidelines
established by the Advanced Coal Extraction Project. This requirement
represents approximately a 30% reduction in existing underground coa; mining
injury rates 0).
The objectives of this study are to examine the health and safety assets
of the tunnel borer system in comparison to contemporary continuous mining
room and pillar operations, determine both design strengths and weaknesses,
and establish whether the tunnel borer can satisfy the stated safety
requirement.
To meet the objectives, the study drew on past tunnel borer engineering
and safety studies, and health and safety evaluations designed as part of the
Advanced Coal Extraction Project (2). The following sections summarize the
findings of the previous studies, and the evaluation schemes employed in this
analysis. The key results of the health and safety evaluations are also
provided as an overview. Finally, a brief paragraph stating the general
structure of the document is provided as a guide to the overall design of the
analysis.
B. SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS STUDIES OF THE TUNNEL BORER SYSTEM
The demonstration and evaluation of the tunnel boring machine in
underground coal mining was a research and development project sponsored by
the U.S. Bureau of Mines, as part of c,^eir High Speed Coal Mine Development
Systems Program. In support of this project the Bureau of Mines sponsored a
system feasibility and safety impact study by James A. Cobb Engineering,
Tulsa, Oklahoma; and DOE sponsored a safety assessment by Battelle Pacific
Northwest Laboratories. Although the basic thrusts of the studies were
different, the conclusions were very similar. The Cobb study concentrated on
^;
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the engineering aspects of designing a safe single-entry system; whereas the
2attelle study was directed more towards a comparative assessment of the
tunnel borer with existing hardware and hazards (3,4). -The Cobb study was
performed at about the same time the Bureau of Mines approved and funded the
tunnel borer project, and was responsible for much of the design of the
system. The Battelle study was completed after the prototype system was in
operation and essentially drew on an already firm design.
in examining the problem of designing a single-entry system, the Cobb
analysis first looked at the tunneling industry. The initial clue to the
possibility that tunneling was safer than contemporary coal mining entry
driving systems came from an overall comparison of injury rates between the
tunneling industry and the underground mining industry. That comparison
suggested that fatality and disabling injury rates in tunneling were
approximately half that of underground coal mining (3). In studying the
single-entry tunneling concept further, stress calculations indicated that
under the same geologic conditions, a circular entry was more stable than the
normal rectangular entry used in coal mining. Additional calculations on
airflow through tubes versus rectangular ducts suggested that a circular entry
also had a better geometry for allowing more ventilation air to reach the face
and dilute liberated methane. Recognizing ground control and methane release
problems as major sources of hazards in underground mining, the Cobb analysis
suggested additional hazard control measures. In the ground control area, the
Cobb study recomoended bolting the roof, followed by spraying a layer of
shotcrete over the tunnel walls. Stress calculations indicated that shotcrete
demonstrated considerable load supporting characteristics down to a thickness
of 2 in. As an additional control over methane liberation, it was reco®ended
that the seam be degasified in advance of the boring machine through the use
of an inseam degasification drill. Although degasification of coal seams is
not new, it was felt that inseam degasification would provide a means of
liberating a greater amount o -the trapped methane. The net thrust of the
Cobb study suggested that the tunnel borer single-entry system would be
inherently safer than contemporary room and pillar entry driving systems
through improved ground control measures, better ventilation, and inseam
degasification (3).
The subsequent Battelle study examined the hazards of the tunnel borer
system in greater detail (4). Determining the potential of the tunnel borer
to reduce fatalities in the major accident c a tegories of roof/face falls,
haulage, explosion/fire, machinery, and electrical was the prime focus of this
safety analysis. The first phase of the analysis was to understand the
mechanisms of worker fatalities in conventional coal mining through fatality
statistics, and the conditions or components of the system that contribt.^ted to
deaths. This phase helped establish the safety similarities and differences
between the two systems, and identified the historically hazardous conditions
which would become obvious by their absence or presence in the tunnel borer
system. The Battelle analysis then comprehensively compared the two systems
in all of the above accident classes. The last step in the analysis was to
apply a subjective rating to the assets and liabilities of the tunnel borer
system in terms of the potential impact on reducing fatalities. The results
of the Battelle study encompassed more accident classes than the Cobb
evaluation (4). The Batt--!'&a evaluation agreed with the results of the Cobb
analysis pertaining to the effect that improved ground control measures,
better ventilation, and degasification would have on reducing serious injuries
1-2
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because of rock falls and explosion. Additionally, the straight line layout
of the machinery components of the tunnel borer system was projected to have a
considerable impact on reducing fatalities caused by machinery impact.
Finally, the attachment of the main power cable to the rib, away from the
working areas, was projected to have a sizable impact on reducing fatalities
related to electrical shock.
Both .re Cobb and Battelle studies were performed at a very general
level. For example, both examined the safety characteristics of the tunnel
borer from the standpoint of reducing worker exposure to roof falls. This
level of analysis has value in identifying basic strong points of a new
design. However, workers are exposed to different kinds of accidents in a
variety of ways during the performance of various tasks. Furthermore, some
tasks are more hazardous than others. One of the overall objectives of the
Advanced Coal Extraction Project is to identify innovative mining systems.
Several of these systems could demonstrate general safety improvements in any
given accident class and only one may offset the serious hazards. The actual
benefits of each system would not become clear unless a more detailed hazard
analysis was conducted. This level of analysis requires a deeper examination
of all the variables that affect injury frequency and severity. The health
and safety evaluations developed under the Advanced Coal Extraction Project,
and applied in this document, provide a means to examine new designs in
greater depth. Since the tunnel borer system exhibited advanced design
characteristics, it provided an excellent test case for the application of the
evaluations. Much of the engineering data provided in the previous studies
were applicable to the detailed hazard and design analyses performed in this
report.
C.	 SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION APPROACHES AND RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
The evaluations used in this report apply to new designs as they move
from a conceptual level to a more firm preliminary design. The conceptual
level evaluation is qualitative in nature and serves only to establish whether
a new design offers health and safety improvements over contemporary systems.
The preliminary design level evaluation is quantitative and projects the
possible effects the new concept could have on :educing injuries. Since the
tunnel borer was completed through the prototype stage, the terms "conceptual"
and "preliminary" design do not apply. For the purpose of this study, the
conceptual and preliminary design evaluations will be respectively termed
$
'qualitative" and quantitative" evaluations.
The health and safety evaluations applied in this study are similarly
structured. Both analyses commence with a complete analysis of potentially
hazardous system failures, followed by an examination of the human interfaces
with hazardous system and geological failures. These two elements are
essential to evaluating new designs to ensure that existing, and possibly new,
hazards are identified. Since advanced systems may not resemble existing
hardware at all, new hazards cannot be assessed until the detailed failure
modes, peculiar to the new system, are understood. The complete analysis of
these two elements comprises the actual hazard analysis and delineates the
potential hazards.
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The next step is to compare the new system against a similar existing
system to identify health and safety improvements. This is done at a
?	 qualitative level to: (1) determine if a new design offers sufficient merit
over existing systems to warrant further development, and (2) direct the
evaluator toward both strong and weak areas of the design that should be
evaluated more closely later on. The important qualitative measures for
s	 safety improvements are: (1) reduced exposure time by improved equipment
design and/or streamlined operations, and (2) more worker protection. The
health evaluation of new designs ends at this stage because actual levels of
exposure to dust, toxic materials, or vibration can only be determined when a
prototype is developed and operated. However, the safety methodology
continues into a quantitative stage where an injury projection is made. The
data required for the injury projection includes task time and crew size
comparisons, additional protective devices, and machinery redesign
possibilities. For each task, manhours at risk are multiplied by the injury
rates observed for similar equipment, and then total system safety performance
is estimated by aggregating rates for various tasks and hazards. This
projection of injuries per million manhours of exposure represents a logically
structured estimate of whether the new system can meet the target safety
requirement. Expert judgment is included to adjust these projections for
potential nonlinear relationships between the degree of exposure to hazards
and the resultant injuries.
The conventional equipment used for comparison against the tunnel borer
was the continuous miner room and pillar system. The comparison was based on
both systems being used to drive entries in preparation for longwall
extraction. Since the continuous miner is not similar to the tunnel borer in
its operation or architecture, the two systems were compared with the
intention of replacing the continuous miner system with the tunnel borer since
the tunnel borer appeared inherently safer.
The results of the qualitative design evaluatioa suggested that the
tunnel borer entry driving system had several safety advantages over the
present continuous miner system in the areas of roof/face falls, haulage,
machinery, and explosions. The major advantage appeared to be in ground
control. This advantage stemmed from a circular roof contour (providing a
better distribution of geologic stresses), and the joint use of roof bolts and
shotcrete (3). Additionally, the flexicore panels, skid, and heavy-duty canopy
for the roof bolters enhanced the protection provided by the system against
roof falls. The results also indicated that haulage accidents near the face
could be reduced by use of an overhead conveyor instead of placing the conveyor
on the floor of the entry. This design appeared to reduce exposure to being
struck or caught by the moving conveyor. Continuous miners, roof bolters, and
haulage equipment operating in the presence of other machinery, are major
sources of machinery related injuries. Conceptually it appeared that the
slower moving tunnel borer (constrained to move in one direction), integrated
miner-roof bolters, and the removal of manned haulage would help reduce
machinery in the face area, and subsequent injuries. The tunnel borer
degasification system, in conjunction with automatic gas monitoring, a greatly
reduced cutter head speed, and improved ventilation, appeared to be positive
design elements to control explosions and fire.
s
The results of the health analysis were also completed at the end of the
qualitative evaluation and are summarized in Table 1-1.
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Table 1-1. Results of the Tunnel Borer Health Analysis (Conventional
Continuoua Miner used as a Comparison)
Design Improvement
Positive	 Neutral	 Negative
Health Hazards
Dust	 X
Toxic compounds	 X
Temperature/Humidity
	 X
Noise	 X
Vibration	 X
Poor Lighting	 X
Psychological stress caused
by cramped work space	 X
The indicated improvement in dust control was based on an extension of
the design beyond dust suppression techniques presently in cask. Existing
techniques include water sprays and ventilation. The tunnel borer employs
these features as well as a lower speed cutter head which fractures the coal
by spalling. This technique results in a larger particle size, which,
in-turn, reduces the amount of airborne dust.
Table 1-1 shows negative improvement in the release of toxic elements
into the mine environment. Detailed examination of the tunnel borer indicated
that this health hazard would be aggravated by the use of shotcrete, which is
basically cement mixed with an epoxy accelerator. Both the cement and epoxy
represented health hazards because of the possibility of inhalation and skin
contact during the shotcrete spraying process. The tunnel borer design
offered no improvements beyond existing conditions in the areas of temperature
and humidity controls, noise, and equipment vibration. However, the tunnel
borer did offer some design improvements in providing workers substantially
improved lighting, and less cramped work space (i.e., a constant ten feet
clearance between the floor and the tunnel divider).
The injury projection is the last stage of the evaluation and is
summarized in Table 1-2, which presents the average yearly injury rates for
both the continuous miner and tunne l borer systems for the dominant accident
classes. The continuous miner injury data are based on a 4-yr average of
Mining Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) injury statistics (5). Of the
major accident classes listed in Table 1-2, the tunnel borer demonstrated the
greatest improvement in reducing roof and face fall injuries, resulting from
the extensive ground control system. The improvement in haulage injuries was
caused by placing the conveyor overhead and away from the workspace areas, and
by eliminating shuttle cars and loaders. The slight projected decrease in
electrical injuries primarily was due to removing the trolley wire from the
system, reducing the number of electrical cables and amount of cable handling,
and placing the main power cable in a relatively inaccessible position on the
rib.
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Table 1-2. Annual Injury Rate Comparison for the Continuous Miner (CM)
and Tunnel Borer (TB) Systems, by Accident Class (injuries
per million manhours)
Fatalities	 Disabling Injuries
Accident Class	 CM	 TB	 CM	 TB
Roof/face/rib falls 0.14 0.01 3 1
Haulage 0.06 0.03 4 3
Machinery 0.03 0.01 S 23
Handling Material 0 0 11 29
Explosion/fire 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Electrical 0.02 0.02 1 0.6
Slip/fall 0 0 4 7
Handtools 0 0 2 7
Pressure line bursts 0 0 0 6
Total 0.3 0.1 30 77
The major design weaknesses stemmed from machinery and handling material
hazards. Although the tunnel borer demonstrated some additional protective
aspects such as remote miner operation, an integrated miner-roof bolter
system, and elimination of vehicular haulage, the introduction of additional
equipment offset these advantages. Equipment such as cranes, shotcrete
machines, and large rib drills are used in the tunneling industry and have
tabulated injury rates. The use of this standard equipment for ground
control, flexicore and beam installation, and degasification resulted in a
projected increase in disabling injuries. The injury projection for handling
material was aggravated by the large manhours and workforce required to
install the tunnel divider. Similarly, hand-tool injuries were also projected
to increase because of the greater usage of hand tools during beam, pipe, and
flexicore installation. The projected increase in disabling injuries
resulting from bursting pressure lines or fittings was due to the large amount
of hydraulic and pneumatic machinery associated with the tunnel borer system.
Though the explosion-related injuries were somewhat mitigated by the
degasification and automatic shutdown systems, these were offset by a slight
projected increase in fire-related injuries because of the use of flammable
hydraulic fluid, and the poor placement of the gas monitor in relation to the
face (i.e., small pockets of gas undetected by the grs monitor could ignite
residual hydraulic fluid).
Overall, the tunnel borer demonstrated a sizable reduction in the
fatality rate, well below the target fatality requirement of no more than 0.2
fatalities per million manhours. However, the projected disabling and total
injury rates of 77 and 100 injuries per million manhours, respectively, fell
short of both the safety performance of present continuous mining systems and
the safety requirement for advanced systems. In conclusion, it appears that
the tunnel borer would not be considered an advanced design from the
standpoint of safety.
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D.	 STRUCTURE OF THE DOCUMENT
This document is designed so the reader is first introduced to both the
continuous miner and tunnel borer systems. Section II provides this
introduction through a detailed discussion of system architectures,
operations, and workforce. This information is then used in Section III to
develop the hazard analysis. Section IV provides the framework and results of
the qualitative health and safety analyses. The results of these analyses
form the foundation for the in-depth injury projections made in Section V, the
quantitative design evaluation. This section explains all the factors used in
making the projections and provides injury projections for the major hazards
identfied with the tunnel borer. Section V also summarises the adjustment of
the injury projections based on the results of the interviews with the
experts. The final statements on the health and safety performance of tunnel
borer in relation to the safety requirements are provided in Section VI.
Concluding comments pertaining to suggested design improvements are also
included in this section. Supporting data for the analysis are provided in
the Appendix.
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SECTION II
DESCRIPTION OF THE TUNNEL BORER AND CONTINUOUS MINER SYSTEMS
A. OVERVIEW
Both the tunnel borer and continuous miner are basically entry driving
systems. These extraction systems lay out large tracts of coal in preparation
for longwall retreat, or advance, mining. The major difference between the
tunnel borer and continuous miner is the entry development process. The
tunnel borer drives one continuous entry through a tract of coal in such a way
as to outline large blocks for longwall extraction. The continuous miner
system is used to outline a panel by driving three to five parallel entries on
each side of a panel. The parallel entries on each side of a panel are
connected by cross-cuts primarily for purposes of ventillation. Thus, driving
one set of parallel entries is analagous to developing a room and pillar
production panel. Although both systems drive entries in preparation for
longwall extraction, the single entry versus the multiple entry approach
requires a different equipment architecture and operating sequence. Existing
equipment is limited to driving 20 ft before roof support is required. This
is because: (1) continuous mining machines are designed such that driving in
excess of 20 ft places the operator and helper under an unsupported roof, and
(2) MSHA regulations do not permit the worker to go under an unsupported
roof. Since the tunnel borer drives a continuous entry, the roof support
system must be integrated with the boring machine. Therefore, the tunnel
borer's architecture provides for the roof support to be installed close
behind the cutters. Another major difference between the two systems is the
haulage process. Whereas conventional room and pillar systems provide some
flexibility in the type of haulage used (such as shuttle cars or conveyors),
the single-entry design dictates that a continuous conveyor be employed
because of the space constraints. The last major difference between the two
systems is the ventilation configuration. The conventional room and pillar
layout of entries provides several channels for airflow and escape routes, in
the event of a gas explosion or fire. The single-entry tunnel borer provides
onl
.7 one route for airflow and escape. To meet existing MSHA regulations,
which require a minimum of two entries for intake and exhaust air and escape,
the tunnel borer system divides the entry horizontally for the full length of
the tunnel. The construction of the divider requires additional equipment not
used in conventional mining.
The detailed discussion of these major differences in terms of equipment
design, operation, and manpower requirements is presented in the remainder of
this section. This information forms the foundation for the hazard
comparisons and injury projections made later in the study.
B. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS
1.	 Tunnel Borer
The tunnel borer scud.'.ed in this report is a modified version of a
boring machine built by the Caiwtid Manufacturing Co. The total system,
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previously used to drive slopes in the development of new coal mines, meets
existing OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) standards for
'	 tunneling equipment and was modified to meet the MSHA (Mine Safety and Health
i	 Administration) safety standards (6). This primarily required the installa-
tion of water sprays at the face for dust control, the addition of methane
monitors,.and the partitioning of the tunnel into two entries (one entry for
air to reach.the face, the other entry for exhaust). The borer cuts an 18 ft
diameter entry using 36 rolling disc cutters. Face material is removed via a
spalling process which results in larger fragments and thus better dust control
than a continuous miner. Three of the cutters gauge the tunnel diameter, and
{	 scraper blades on the perimeter of the cutting head help smooth the tunnel
1	 walls. Water sprays provide 50 gal/min at, or near, each cutter to abate any
I	 dust generated while cutting. The tunnel borer also has two protected roof-
bolting stations located on both sides of the machine, 12 ft from the face.
The tunnel borer is trailed by a secondary skid unit that contains the trans-
:	 former and breaker box, the main electric pump drive motors and hydraulic
pumps, which provide the pressure to operate the borer; hydraulic fluid
storage tanks, and the operator's station. A third skid, 50 ft long, trails
the secondary unit and houses materials for laying track and installing
divider support beams. An electrically operated rib drill and a pneumatically
operated crane are mounted on the rear of the skid to facilitate the placement
and handling of these materials. The crane is also used to move and position
the electric degasification drill which is located directly behind the skid.
The shotcrete machinery (the spraying unit, batching unit, and mixing unit) is
also electrically operated and provides a 3- to 4-in. shotcrete liner which is
sprayed over the roof bolts for additional roof support. This equipment is
located behind the degasification drill. The next 400 ft of tunnel, behind
the shotcrete and degasification equipment, contains the California switch,
which is a rail car switching unit consisting of a double track. Rail cars
containing support materials are brought in on one track, while muck cars are
moved in and out on the other parallel track. A series of sliding, full-
width, temporary tunnel dividers support an overhead conveyor, which dumps
muck through a hopper and into the rail cars approximately 250 ft outby the
degas and shotcrete machinery. The last piece of major support equipment in
the system, a pneumatically operated crane, is located just behind the hopper
in between the rail tracks. This crane is used to move and place permanent
flexicore tunnel dividers (pre-stressed concrete beams 16 1/2 ft long, 2 ft
wide, and 6 in. thick) on the divider support beams.
The overall length of the tunnel borer system is 640 ft. The primary
mine power of 7200 Vac must be reduced to 480 V and 110 V, respectively, for
machinery operation and lighting. The hydraulic pumps, which drive the motors
for cutter head rotation operate at 2500 psi; while the hydraulic jacks, which
support and move the borer, and provide cutter head thrust, operate at
5000 psi. The roof bolters are also hydraulically operated. Figure 2-1
displays the general layout of the complete system.
2.	 Continuous Miner
The major pieces of machinery employed in the multiple entry
continuous miner system are: (1) continuous mining machine, (2) loader-
gatherer (although shown here as a separate component, it is actually an
integral part of the continuous miner), (3) bridge conveyor or shuttle car,
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(4) roof bolter machine, and (5) outby haulage such as rail cars or conveyor
(4). The continuous miner is electrically operated and moves either on
crawlers or wheels. A hydraulically operated boom, mounted on the front of
the machine, contains a motor-driven cutter drum laced with conical bits which
break the coal into small pieces as the rotating drum is pressed into the face.
The loader-gatherer is also attached to the front end of the miner and forms a
large pan to catch the coal as it falls from the face. Two eccentrically co-
ordinated arras sweep the broken coal back onto a small conveyor for discharge
from the rear of the miner. The discharged coal then falls onto an electri-
cally driven bridge conveyor which can be articulated around the corners of
pillars. The coal is then dumped into electrically powered shuttle cars which
carry the coal to a secondary conveyor. Transport out of the mine is by con-
veyor or rail cars. Shuttle cars are usually four-wheel vehicles, electrical-
ly powered via a trailing cable. A cable reel stores the trailing cable on
the car. Average load carrying capacity is 6 tons, which can be doubled by
the addition of side boards. It is understood that there can be numerous
combinations of haulage equipment. For convenience in the following hazard
analysis, the conveyor, shuttle car, and ;ail car combination best suits the
comparison with the tunnel borer.
The roof bolter has one or two booms with electric motors mounted at the
end to drill and torque roof bolts. Tungsten carbide, auger-type bits are
employed in drilling the bolt holes. Reinforcing rod bolts are then inserted
and held in place by expansion shell anchors or by fast setting resin.
C.	 SYSTEM OPERATION
1.	 Tunnel Borer
The tunnel borer advances in a series of approximately 30-in.
steps with alignment maintained by a laser guidance system. The machine is
supported by six hydraulic jacks which allow the machine to be anchored during
the thrusting and cutting stage. The cutting cycle is operated remotely from
the control skid and is initiated by thrusting the boring head against the
face. When the head has reached a full stroke, the two inside belly jacks are
extended to support the machine while the two outside belly jacks and the
thrust jacks are retracted. Next, the machine body is advanced to the head
and the two outside belly jacks are reset. The inside support jacks are then
retracted and the machine is ready to cut again. Two sets of horizontal jacks
push against the sides of the tunnel to keep the machine straight,
r
i
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As the tunnel borer advances, the two roof bolters on the sides of the
machine drill and insert the roof bolts. Resin-grouted roof bolts are placed
on approximately 5-ft centers, six bolts spanning the arc of the roof.
Behind the control room skid, the beam setting and track laying activi-
ties are taking place. The rib is first drilled before the beam support
brackets are bolted on the sides of the tunnel, followed by the Installation
of the flexicore support beams. Prefabricated track sections employing steel
channel ties rolled to the curvature of the tunnel are also installed at this
time. The crane, mounted on the back of the skid used for these operations,
assists in moving and placing these components.
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As the system advances, the degasification drill bores horizontal holes
1000 ft into the center of the coal seam. These holes are aligned 10 to 15
deg from the horizontal axis of the tunnel, and drilled into both sides of Lne
rib. Liberated gas is channeled into an 8-in. pipeline and transported to the
surface. Each degasification hole has an automatic shutoff valve that is
activated if gas sensors, placed along the pipeline, sense greater than 12
methlne. in the event a major roof fall causes pipeline damage, the valves
& matically close.
The shotcreting area extends approximately 35 to 90 ft behind the face.
Bulk material, such as cement and sand, is brought in on rail cars. The
shotcrete is mixed and fed through a hopper before it is sprayed over the
roof bolts. As the borer progresses, temporary sliding dividers which rest on
the cross beams are shifted out of the way so a thin layer of shotcrete (3- to
4-in. thick) can be sprayed in the upper compartment of the tunnel, up to 35
ft from the face. For added strength, the shotcrete is also sprayed over the
beam supports and tunnel walls in the lower compartment.
While the borer is cutting, six pickup buckets on the cutter head remove
the face material and dump it into a hopper just behind the head. The hopper
feeds the material onto a 36-in. wide conveyor belt which, in turn, transports
the material to the hopper 250 ft downstream from the face. Rail cars are
automatically spotted under the loading chute attached to the hopper, and
eventually transport the coal to the mine mouth.
Since the tunnel divider provides the intake and exhaust passages for
the ventilating air, the permanent divider must be placed as the temporary
sliding dividers advance with the tunnel borer. The pre-stressed concrete
panels are hoisted in place, aligned and locked together through a tongue and
groove configuration, and then grouted to seal against air leaks.
To assist workers in operating equipment and performing support tasks,
all the work areas in the tunnel are illuminated by 30-W fluorescent lamps
which provide an average intensity of 0.06-ft Lambert lumens.
2.	 Continuous Miner
The nominal entry width in underground coal mining is 20 ft. The
entries are driven parallel to each other on approximately 80-ft centers (4).
Crosscuts perpendicular to the entries are usually placed on 100-ft centers
(4). The cutting sequence is initiated by lumping the cutter head into the
coal face at the top of the coal seam. The depth of the cut is a function of
coal hardness and cutter head speed. The cutter drum is moved vertically down
the face to the base of the seam, withdrawn, raised to top of the seam, and
sumped in again for the next cut. Cutting half of thr entry width, the
machine drives approximately 15 to 20 ft until the operator approaches the end
of supported roof. Subsequently, the machine is backed out and positioned to
cut the remaining half of the entry. Temporary support is placed in the mined
portion to prevent major roof falls while the second half of the entry is
extracted.
As the continuous miner cuts and advances, the coal is gathered by the
loader located underneath the cutter drum and discharged onto the bridge
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conveyor attached to the rear of the machine. The bridge conveyor is
articulated so it can flexibly move with the continuous miner. Each section
of the conveyor is hydraulically steered. The coal is then either transferred
directly into shuttle cars (for transfer to a rail car dumping point), or onto
another conveyor which dumps into a hopper for rail car loading.
Once the full entry width is cut, the continuous miner and associated
haulage equipment are trammed to the next entry where the same cutting cycle
is initiated. Workiars then place more temporary support in the vacated
entry. The roof is then inspected, tested for weaknesses, loose material
barred down, and bolt locations are marked. The roof bolter is trammed into
position under the marked areas. The drill is inserted and the roof bolter
helper assists the machine operator in positioning the boom at the right
locations. The roof is then drilled, and bolts are inserted and properly
torqued. Upon completion of the roof bolting task, the temporary support is
removed and the roof bolter is trammed to the next entry vacated by the miner.
After the bolter has moved to the next entry, battery-powered scoops are
sometimes employed to move loose coal toward the face where it can be picked
up by the miner when it returns to the area. The scoop and bolter follow the
continuous miner from entry to entry until eventually the whole cycle starts
again at the first entry.
Face ventilation for gas and dust control must be arranged such that
intake air is directed down occupied entries, across the face, and then
exhausted down unworked entries. This is achieved by building walls (called
stoppings) across old entries and using temporary curtains (called brattice)
to close off the appropriate entries near the working areas.
D.	 MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS
1.	 Tunnel Borer
Operation of the tunnel borer encompasses multiple tasks spread
across several work areas, The borer is controlled and monitored from the
work platform, located directly behind the machine. The two roof bolting
stations on the sides of the machine are independently operated and, because
there is little room for extra supplies, support material must be frequently
carried to these stations from the outby supply cars. The secondary skid,
which acts as the work station for the beam installation and track laying
activities, requires several workers to assist in drilling and installing beam
supports, and handling the cross beams and track sections. Water-pipe laying
and power-cable hanging are also performed at this station. The degasification
activity requires workers to operate and guide the drill. The shotcreting
process calls for several tasks that include operating the batching and mixing
machines, reeling hose, spraying shotcrete, and moving materials from supply
cars to the batching area. Behind the shotcreting area, near the loading
hopper, workers must operate and monitor the conveyor, monitor the loading of
cars, and perform cleanup around the hopper. Finally, the installat-:on of the
permanent flexicore panels requires several workers to move and position the
panels, operate the hoist, and grout the tongue and groove slots against air
leaks. The total manpower to perform all of the above tasks is 22 persons
(6), and a listing for each task is shown in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1. Manpower Required by the Tunnel borer
Task	 Required Personnel
runnel borer foreman 	 1
Tunnel borer operator 	 1
Roof bolter operator 	 2
Roof bolter helper (assists bolter
operators and provides materials)	 1
Degas drill operator and helper 	 2
Shotcrete crew helper (helps reel
hose and provides materials)	 1
Shotcrete crew (conveyor man)	 1
Shotcrete crew (batch man) 	 1
Shotcrete crew (hose man) 	 1
Shotcrete crew (nozzle man) 	 1
Bull gang (install beam brackets, beams,
track, flexicore, piping, cable, and tunnel 	 5
repairs)
Cleanup man	 2
Haulage motor man	 2
Conveyor and chute operator 	 1
Total
	
22
2. Continuous Miner
Entry development tasks associated with the continuous miner
system essentially involve operating the continuous miner, monitoring coal
loading and articulating the bridge conveyor as the continuous miner moves,
cleaning up, providing temporary support, operating the roof bolter, and
setting brattice. Associated with the machine operations is the task of cable
reeling and handling (keeping the cable from being damaged;. The total
workforce required for these tasks is 11 to 12 persons (4), and is shown in
Table 2-2.
3. Comparison of the Two Systems
In comparing the two systems, it appears that some major
differences exist in the operation of equipment and design of ventilation.
The first major difference stems from the amount of equipment required. Both
systems contain the basics; namely, the mining machines, roof support system,
and haulage. While, the continuous miner system is essentially completed by
these basics, the tunnel borer requires the additional use of material
handling hoists, shotcrete machinery, and a degasification drill. This
additional equipment leads to the second major difference between the two
systems - their respective manpower requirements. The preceding tables
suggest that operation of the extra tunneling equipment, particularly
associated with the construction of the tunnel divider, increases the number
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Table 2-2. Manpower Required by the Continuous Miner
Task	 Required Personnel
Continuous miner foreman l
Continuous miner operator 1
Continuous miner helper (reels cable
and assists temporary support activity) 1
Clean-nsp oan and conveyor operator 2-3
Tempor.+ry support man 2
Roof bolter operator 1
Roof bolter helper 1
Brattice man 2
Total	 11-12
of workers in the system by almost a factor of two. These differences become
pivotal factors in the hazard analysis and injury projections performed later
in the study.
r
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SECTION III
HAZARD ANALYSIS
A. OVERVIEW
The hazard analysis presented in this section is based on the techniques
developed in both the "Safety Evaluation Methodology for Advanced Coal
Extraction Systems" and "Health Requirements for Advanced Coal Extraction
Systems" (2, 7).
The key purpose of any safety evaluation is to understand what hazards
might be present in a particular design, and what the sources of those hazards
are. The structured approach developed in the above methodologies first
requires an identification and evaluation of system failures that can expose
workers to substantial hazards. Such failures include machinery breakdown,
unpredictable geologic events, and human error. T1ne next step is to
systematicclly identify whether workers may be interacting with the system at
the time of failure, since the consequences of these failures may be of such
magnitude as to injure workers. This comprehensive approach to identifying
hazards is important because it provides a means of discovering hazards unique
to a new system.
A comprehensive list of hazards associated with existing equipment was
provided in the above references as a general guide to hazard identification.
This hazard list was developed by using fault tree analysis and MSHA injury
statistics, This list assisted in identifying hazards associated with tunnel
borer components used in conventional mining, and alto provided a cause and
effect logic for understanding how new hazards may occur as a result of unique
system failures. This section is primarily directed at the tunnel borer
system since the continuous miner hazards are already well documented by
historical data (1, S). A hazard comparison of the two systems is provided at
the end of the section in preparation for the qualitative design evaluation.
B. TUNNEL BORER SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS
The three major kinds of system failures identified in the safety
methodology are machinery, geological and environmental (such as rock falls
and gas intrusion), and human (2). Machinery can fail as a result of
age-reliability degradation or improper design. Ceological failures primarily
include roof and rib falls resulting from high stresses in the rock strata as
the coal is removed, and gas release because of the intersection of Ras
pockets during the removal of coal. Human erxvc includes inexperience, poor
visibility or poor working conditions (e.g., constrained workspace and
slippery footing), fatigue, and carelessness.
In analyzing the tunnel borer machine failures, the total system was
first separated into the major groupings of machinerv, and then each machine
was broken down into major components (e.g., cutters, pumps, hydraulics,
boons, etc.). Failure data were obtained from discussions with two major
tunnel borer users and two major tunneling equipment manufacturers (8, 9, 10,
I1). Geological and environmental failures associated with tunneling and coal
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mining were based on discussions with the tunneling contractors and general
coal mining experience (8, 9). Human errors peculiar to the tunneling
`	 industry were also obtained from the tunneling contractors (8, 9). Human
errors typical of the coal mining environment, and equally applicable to the
tunnel borer system, were listed previously in the safety evaluation report
and are simply summarized again (2).
1.	 Machinery Failures
As indicated in Section 11, the major equipment in the tunnel
borer system are; (1) the tunnel borer and control room skid; (2) roof bolters;
(3) the beam and track laying hoist; (4) degasification drill and beam support
drill; (S) shotcreting machinery; (6) supply and haulage rail cars, and
loading hopper; (7) conveyor; and (8) the flexicore installation hoist.
Though each one, of these pieces of equipment has hundreds of components, the
discussions with the various contractors placed emphasis on *_hose components
which contribute to major system breakdowns. Consequently, the following
analysis addresses only the dominant failures which contribute to system
shutdown or delays.
The major sources of system failures on the tunneling machine revolve
around the cutter head, hydraulics, and support jacks. The components most
subject to failure on the cutter head are the muck buckets and cutting discs.
The muck buckets break and chip because of impact by large rock fragments off
the face. Cutter discs fail primarily because of wear. The main shaft
bearing, which supports the cutter head, experiences wear as a result of dirt
working into the bearing surface.
The key components involved in hydraulic failures are: (1) pumps,
(2) relief valves, (3) filters, (4) fittings, and (S) lines. Pump failures
center around bearing wear and seal leakage, while relief valves, fittings,
and lines fail because of age, or because of accidental impact while
performing other maintenance. Hydraulic filters usually require replacement
because of contamination introduced during maintenance or while replacing
hydraulic fluid.
The hydraulic support jacks for the tunnel borer often experience
fatigue because of sustained thrust pressures associated with supporting and
stabilizing the tunnel borer. This type of fatigue often results in seal
failures and cracks in the support pads.
Conventional electrically operated roof bolters and face drills
typically experience failures associated with electrical connections, drive
motor burnout, and drill wear or breakage. These are typical problems
experienced by the electrically powered drills employed in the degasification
and beam installation activities. One additional problem that can contribute
to drill breakage is failure to guide the drill properly. This is often the
result of the drill intersecting a very hard parting in the strata and being
deflected. Roof bolters used with the tunnel borer are hydraulically
operated, which shifts the standard electrical failures to hydraulic failures
such as line and fitting ruptures, and seal leaks. Drill binding and bit wear
are also typical failures with this system.
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As discussed earlier, the operator's control room skid is located behind
the tunnel borer and contains the fluid reservoirs and hydraulic pumps that
supply pressure to operate the tunnel borer. Typical failure modes of these
components were discussed above. In addition to these hydraulic components,
the operator's station also contains transformers that provide the power to
operate the hydraulic pump motors, lighting, degasification drill, and
shotcrete machinery. Trailing cables from the transformer provide power to
the various machinery. Electrical failures associated with the transformers
and cables are primarily associated with corrosion of terminals (because of
acidic airborne moisture), and cable failure at the terminals. Corroded cable
leads often break when the leads are periodically removed and cleaned. One
design feature of the tunnel borer system which reduces cable failures, is the
straight line layout of the equipment, which alleviates cable damage because
of abrasion by pillar corners or equipment impact.
The two pneumatic hoists used in the tunnel borer system are typical of
cranes used in the tunneling industry. Hoist failures generally center around
pressure line ruptures (because of age or being impacted) and hose fitting
blowouts. Loss of system pressure can be catastrophic (such as boom collapse)
or simply cause system shutdown. Other kinds of hoist failures revolve around
age-reliability degradation of components such as gearboxes, braking
mechanisms, and the boom. The rate of gear and brake wear is basically a
function of the magnitude of the forces transferred to these components
through the process of lifting or lowering loads. Similarly, boom fatigue is
also a function of load size and load center of gravity in relation to where
the hoist cables are attached. For example, hoisting a heavy load at a point
off the center of gravity, and allowing the load to swing as it is being
moved, can impart large bending and twisting stresses to the boom. Addition-
ally, allowing a heavy load to pendulum in an undamped manner can make it
difficult to control the boom and, in a constrained workspace, can result in
both load and boom damage if either strikes another object. Other potential
failures associated with controlling the load are load slippage and seperarion
of the cables or chains used for hoisting. These failures are usually the
result of not attaching the cables securely, or exceeding the strength of the
slings because of overloading or age-reliability degradation. As most of the
above components are metal, the fatigue process is accelerated by corrosion,
which result from the damp mine environment.
The primary problems experienced with the application of shotcrete and
related machinery are; (1) control of the shotcrete layer thickness, (2) pump
failure, (3) pressure line blockage, (4) hopper and mixer clogging, (S) mixer
plate and spray nozzle wear, and (6) control of rebound and shotcrete dust
suspended in the air.
Shotcrete is usually applied to the tunnel wall to improve ground
control and prevent weathering and subsequent rib sic-aghing. if the shotcrete
is not applied evenly and to the correct thickness, roof or rib stresses can
fracture the shotcrete and subsequently jeopardize roof and rib support. Pump
failures usually occur because of bearing wear and motor burnout. Hopper and
mixer clogging, and line blockage generally are caused by hardening of
residual shotcrete after spraying. Line blockage can result in a pressure
line rupture if it is not cleared properly. Mixer plate and nozzle wear
result from the abrasive nature of shotcrete. The shotcrete rebound control
problem stems from the high pressure under which the shotcrete is applied.
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Shotcrete deposition on other equipment and the tunnel floor requires
continual cleanup. Additionally, the abrasive and corrosive nature of
shotcrete aggravates wear and tear on other equipment in the area.
Haulage failures associated with the conveyor, loader hopper, and rail
car system make up the final machinery related problems. Conveyor problems
are caused by loss of belt tension or belt separation, loss of lubrication on
the belt rollers, and drive chain separation. Clogging is the main failure
experienced by the loader hopper. The rail car system is composed of the
battery-powered rail cars and track. Locomotives typically experience battery
and switch failures. Another important system failure is rail car derailment,
which is due to shifting loads or track discontinuities. The tunnel borer
rail system design requires that shotcrete be applied around the track to
maintain track alignment. Although this helps prevent lateral movement, it
does not adequately prevent vertical movement because of floor heave, which
can in turn have undesirable consequences on track alignment. In particular,
floor heave can raise the track and cause cracking of the shotcrete, allowing
lateral track movement, subsequently contributing to derailments.
The frequency of component failures becomes important when examining
worker exposure to hazards. To assist in the safety analysis, Table 3-1
displays the relative occurrence of the various kinds of machinery-related
failures in terms of "frequent" or "infrequent". The term "frequent" implies
that a given failure is encountered on a daily or weekly basis. "Infrequent"
implies that the failure is dealt with on a monthly or yearly basis.
2.	 Geological and Environmental Failures
Most rock falls are smaller loose material that sloughs off the
roof or rib. However, stress buildup in the strata, coupled with not placing
support in sufficient time, can result in releases of large slabs. Though the
tunnel borer is considerably larger than most conventional underground mining
equipment, falls of this magnitude would still result in extensive equipment
damage. Smaller roof, rib, or face sloughing could cause damage to the cutter
head and overhead conveyor; or damage the tunnel borer support jacks. Machine
stability problems are caused by sloughed material falling underneath the
tunnel borer, creating an unstable support foundation for the jacks.
Another type of geological failure that particularly effects the tunnel
borer is rib squeeze, which is the result of large roof stresses being
transferred to the side walls of the tunnel. This type of failure results in
an excessive loading of the side support jacks, and can result in jack failure
or machine entrapment. Similarly, floor heave can result in failure to
maintain the machine on the desired horizontal path of the entry. Rock bursts
are another type of geological failure related to excessive pressures in the
strata. This type of failure can cause serious injury and equipment damage as
a result of impact by debris.
_	 E	 Gas or water intrusion are environmental failures which result,
respectively, from: (1) the normal bleeding of methane from coal as it is
extracted, and (2) the intersection of a large pocket of trapped water or
underground stream. Ignition of gas can result in explosion or fire which can
cause extensive equipment damage; and engulfment by water could cause
equipment entrapment and power failure.
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Table 3-1. Relative Frequency of Major Machinery-Related Failures
Relative Occurrence
Machinery/Component
Failures	 Frequent	 Infrequent
Tunnel Borer
Cutter wear and muck bucket breakage	 X
Main shaft bearing wear	 X
Pump bearing wear	 X
Pump seal wear	 X
Relief valve, line, and fitting leakage	 X
Hydraulic filter clogging	 X
Hydraulic support jack seal leakage 	 X
Hydraulic support jack pad cracking	 X
De¢as and Rib Drills
Drive motor burnout	 X
Electrical connection fouling 	 X
Drill wear	 X
Drill breakage due to guidance problems	 X
Drill breakage due to binding	 X
Roof Bolters
Hydraulic line and fitting leakage 	 X
Drill wear and binding 	 X
Electrical Components
Transformer failure 	 X
Cable terminal corrosion 	 X
Cable failure due to abrasion or
impact by other machinery	 X
Pneumatic Hoists
Pressure line and fitting ruptures	 X
Gearbox and brake wear	 X
Boom fatigue resulting in cracking 	 X
Load instability	 X
Hoist cable breakage	 X
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Table 3-1. (Cont'd)
Relative Occurrence
Machinery/Component
Failures	 Frequent	 Infrequent
Shotcrete Machinery
Control of shotcrete thickness
	 X
Pump failure	 X
Pressure line blockage
	 X
Hopper and mixer clogging 	 X
Mixer plate and nozzle wear
	 X
Shotcrete rebound
	 X
Haulage
Loss of conveyor belt tension
	 X
Conveyor belt separation
	 X
Loss of lubrication on belt rollers
and chain drive
	 X
Drive chain separation	 X
Clogging of loader hopper	 X
Rail car battery and switch failure
	 X
Track misalignment
	 X
Derailment	 X
Although it is understood that the incidence and magnitude of geological
and environmental failures are site specific, Table 3-2 displays the general
frequency of these kinds of failures relative to each other under normal
tunneling and mining conditions. Again, the term "frequent" implies that
workers encounter these problems on a daily or weekly basis; whereas
"infrequent" suggests a time frame of months or years between failures.
3.	 Human Error
Although human error can sometimes be traced to carelessness, the
mine environment in which workers operate machinery and perform support tasks
contributes equally to the problem. Human error can often be the result of
inexperience, or bad working conditions, such as poor lighting, constrained
work space, or fatigue. Typical sources of human errors in contemporary
underground coal mining are as follows (2):
r	
(1)	 Lack of experience on how and where to set ground control
t	 components.
(2)	 Choice of tools poorly suited for a given task.
3-6
Table 3-2. Relative Frequency of Geological and Environmental Failures
Relative Occurrence
Geological/Environmental
Failures
	
Frequent	 Infrequent
Small-scale roof, rib, or face sloughing
	 X
Large-scale roof falls X
Large-scale rib squeeze X
Floor heave X
Rock bursts X
Gas intrusion X
Large-scale water intrusion X
(3) Handling cumbersome materials on loose or slippery footing.
(4) Inexperienced or careless operation of machinery.
(S)	 Inadequate visibility of operations, because of poor lighting or
other obstacles, during machine operation.
(6) Workers trying to move objects or tools too quickly and drop them.
(7) Constrained or poorly lit work area, not allowing workers to
monitor other events taking place in the immediate vicinity.
These sources of human error can result in system failures related to:
(1) improperly maintained machinery, (2) not being able to properly control
machinery, and (3) breakage of hand tools, machinery components, or support
materials. With the exception of errors associated with setting ground
components and poor lighting, all of the above causes of human error in
conventional mining are equally applicable to the tunnel borer system. For
example, the tunnel borer is remotely operated from the control room skid
located behind the machine. Setting the hydraulic support jacks in the wrong
sequence can result in: (1) improper guidance of the system, (2) excessive
stress on the support jacks, or (3) allowing the machine to tip forward onto
the cutter head. Similarly, moving loads attached to the hoists too quickly,
or not observing proper clearance between the load and the tunnel wall, can
result in impacting the tunnel wall or other objects. During the shotcrete
operation it is imperative to control the direction of the high pressure
flow. Not properly observing the direction of the stream, or losing control
of the nozzle due to recoil or pressure fluctuations in the hose, can result
in damage to other equipment or the main electrical cable. Although the
frequency of these human errors is difficult to assess, it is important to
understand their role in increasing stress on equipment and resultant system
failures.
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C.	 HLMAN INTERACTION WITH SYSTEM FAILURES
The degree of interaction between system failures and workers determines
the presence of particular hazards. Worker interfaces with potential system
failures occur through the various tasks performed. These tasks range from
equipment operation to support tasks; such as material handling, cleanup, and
maintenance. Section II -C introduced the principal activities associated with
tunnel borer operation. This section defines these activities in greater
detail and relates all of the tasks to the system failures described above.
s
1.	 Machinery Failures
The most frequent failures in the cutte~ head area are related to
the muck buckets and cutter discs. Workers interface with these failures in
the process of replacin- or welding the muck buckets, or while dressing or
replacing the cutters. Since the tunnel borer is not very mobile, this type
of maintenance must be done in the face area. Although the failure of the
F	 main shaft bearing is infrequent, replacement is a major task usually requir-
ing removal of the cutter head to gain access to the bearing. Again, this
task must be performed in the face area. Components such as relief valves,
lines, fittings, and filters are the high -frequency failure items in the
hydraulic subsystem. Workers interface with these failures when performing
routine checks and unscheduled maintenance on both the tunnel borer machine
and control room skid. Hydraulic pump replacement is usually contained to the
control room skid. Maintenance on the support jacks requires workers to
remove the main support column to gain access to the seals. If the belly jack
seals require replacement, additional jacks must be placed under the machine
while the seals are removed. Stress cracks in the support pads or main
support columns can usually be welded.
The high-frequency failures associated with the degasification and rib
drills center around electrical connections and drill wear or breakage.
Workers interface with these respective failures while cleaning and checking
connections and while removing and replacing worn or broken drill sections.
The hydraulically powered roof bolters are attached to guide rails on the
borer and are usually repaired in place. These repairs typically involve
replacement of leaking seals or pressure lines, as well as worn or broken
drills.
Standard maintenance on the transformers in the control room require
workers to check and clean all electrical connections. Though cable failures
are infrequent, workers must still check and clean all terminals to which the
trailing cables are attached. The main power cable leading to the 480-V
transformer must be securely attached to the rib u!^ the tunnel borer advances.
t	 Workers perform this task while installing the beam support brackets and beams.
Pneumatic hoist failures can involve a wide range of worker activities.
`
	
	
Additionally, Section II-D identified a large number of workers :associated
with the track, beam, and flexicore installation tasks. in performing these
tasks, workers must manually lift the components to attach the hedst slings,
guide the component in place, and secure it. Consequently, the hoist
operators and helpers are working in the vicinity of the boom, the moving
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load, and the pressure lines. Other tasks performed in the immediate vicinity
of the hoists are the degasification, shotcreting, and haulage operations.
Hoist maintenance usually involves scheduled checks of pneumatic fitting
connections, periodic replacement of worn or damaged pressure lines, boom
inspection to locate corrosion or stress cracks (and welding as required),
lubrication, and periodic inspection and replacement of hoist slings. All of
the hoist maintenance is done in place.
The shotcreting operation also involves several workers. As stated
earlier, the most frequent failures are related to line blockage, hopper and
mixer clogging, mixer plate and spray nozzle wear, and rebound. Workers
interface with line blockage and possible pressure bursts while spraying the
shotcrete, and monitoring the batching and mixing process. Hopper and mixer
clogging require workers to periodically unjam and clear the residual concrete.
;fixer plate and nozzle wear are maintenance items requiring periodic replace-
ment. The rebound and spray control problems not only involve the immediate
nozzle man and helper, but can also interface with workers performing the
degasification, and beam and track laving activities. The clearing of exces-
sive amounts of rebound is a pick and shovel cleanup task.
Haulage failures occur largely in the conveyor belt area. Workers must
periodically adjust belt tension, inspect for belt wear, replace belt sec-
tions, and lubricate the rollers and drive chain. With the exception of belt
replacement, these tasks are usually done while the belt is operating. In
conjunction with the inspection task, workers often clean up spillage around
the belt and in the hopper area. Rail car maintenance generally involves
removing, replacing, and testing batteries and switches. Battery maintenance
also includes checking water levels and cleaning the terminals. Track main-
tenance requires workers to clean spillage off the tracks, and to periodically
replace ties and worn track. Raising track sections and leveling the founda-
tion to maintain track alignment are also part of track maintenance activities.
Although rail car derailments are infrequent, workers interface with this
system failure during rail car operation, and when hoisting or jacking the
cars back in place. Correcting a derailment often requires reloading the gob
by hand into the cars.
2.	 Geological and Environmental Failures
As indicated in the discussion on geologic failures in Section
III-B., roof, rib, and face sloughing occur frequently. Under normal condi-
tions, the combination of roof bolts and shotcrete will prevent roof and rib
sloughing up to 35 ft from the face (which is where the shotcrete ends). As
roof bolts are placed 12 ft from the face, only the boring machine, first con-
veyor stage, and roof bolting stations are exposed to impact by falling rock.
Thus, workers are exposed to potential rock falls while performing maintenance
on the cutter head or support jacks, while operating or maintaining the roof
bolters, and while maintaining or performing cleanup around the first stage
conveyor. As stated in the section pertaining to system description, the roof
bolting stations are protected. This does mitigate the fall problem substan-
tially. Additionally, the side support jacks assist in preventing any sizable
rib slough. However, workers are exposed to roof slough while removing fallen
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debris away from the side and belly support jacks. In the event of major rib
squeeze, workers are required to place explosive charges in the rib in order
to free the machine. This activity also requires a large amount of cleanup
once the machine is dislodged. Cleanup and leveling is also required in the
event of floor heave.
Another frequent environmental failure is the intersection of methane
pockets and release of gas into the face area. In the event of explosion or
fire, the operator, roof bolters and helper, and cleanup personnel will be
exposed to serious injury. Depending on the size of the gas pocket and rate
of propagation of the resulting explosion and fire, workers performing
shotcreting and beam and track installation could be impacted as well.
3.	 Human Error
Human errors that occur while maintaining, operating, or moving
equipment can involve either a direct interaction (such as dropping an object
on another worker in the area), or an indirect interaction (such as improperly
operating machinery, resulting in an equipment failure which impacts other
workers). Examples of possible direct interaction type human errors
associated with the tunnel borer system are as follows:
(1) Worker handles a machine or support component (such as a
cutter disc, drill bit or drill section, beam support
bracket, beam, water pipe section, flexicore) by himself or
with another worker at an elevation, or on poor footing,
slips and drops component.
(2) Worker improperly applies a tool or special support
equipment (such as a jack for propping up a track section,
or jacking up the tunnel borer) for maintenance or cleanup,
and the tool slips or breaks.
(3) Worker cannot properly control the shotcrete spray direction
because of recoil in the hose while other workers are
performing tasks in the immediate vicinity.
(4) Worker operates hoists or haulage machinery and is not able
to observe other workers in the vicinity due to poor
visibility or obstructions.
Examples of errors involving indirect interactions are as follows:
(1) Worker operates machinery improperly, or at a faster rate than
specified, resulting in an equipment failure (such as not
controlling the swing rate of the hoist boom and impacting the
tunnel wall while other workers are working near the rib; or,
operating rail cars too fast resulting in derailment while workers
are performing track repairs in the immediate vicinity).
(2) Worker operates machinery improperly resulting in an equipment
failure, which in turn exposes workers to other kinds of system
!	 failures (such as improperly sequencing the support jacks,
i
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exposing workers to potential rock falls while jacking up the
borer to realign the cutter head at the face).
(3) 'Workers improperly maintain equipment, resulting in equipment
failure, which subsequently exposes workers to other kinds of
system failures (such as not checking the belt tension or not
lubricating the conveyor drive chain and rollers, requiring
workers to interface with rock falls in the first stage overhead
conveyor area).
In examining all the various worker interactions with machinery,
geologic, and human failures, the potential hazards associated with the tunnel
borer system become evident. The next section draws on this information, as
well as historical data, to determine more precisely the nature of each hazard.
D.	 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Identification of hazards follows directly from the analysis of worker
interaction with system failures. Historical injury data are an additional
source of information that help confirm the existence of suspected hazards.
Since the tunnel borer system contains components used in contemporary mining
(such as roof bolters, transformers, electrical cables, conveyors, and rail
cars), MSHA injury statistics tabulated by worker activity were useful in
substantiating hazards related to this equipment (5). Injury statistics
involving other components such as the borer, degasification drill, hoists,
and shotcrete machinery were obtained from the Safety Division of the Bureau
of Reclamation in Denver, Colorado (12). The Bureau of Reclamation is
responsible for monitoring and tabulating injuries for all tunneling
operations west of the Mississippi River. Four years of tunneling injury data
provided a substantial base from which to confirm hazards representative of
equipment used in the tunneling industry.
Before listing the hazards associated with the tunnel borer system, the
following cause (system failure and worker interaction) and effect (hazard)
relationships are provided to demonstrate how hazards are generated. For
example, one interaction with machinery failures discussed in the previous
section was the improper operation of the hoist. The cause of the hazard
would be; "swinging boom strikes tunnel wall while workers are installing beam
support brackets and beams". The resultant hazard would be; "workers are in a
position to be struck by collapsing boom or falling load." One cause- and
effect-relationship related to the degasification drill is as follows:
"workers are operating degas drill when drill stem breaks - workers in a
position to be struck or caught by broken drill fragment". This hazard would
also apply to the rib drill and roof bolters. The shotcrete operation
exhibits the following hazard: "workers are operating shotcrete equipment when
line blockage causes pressure line rupture - workers in a position to be
struck by shotcrete spray and whipping hose". An example of a hazard
generated by a geologic failure would be: "workers are performing maintenance
on the muck buckets or cutter discs at the face - workers in a position to be
struck by roof or face fall". Similarly, all the various kinds of system
failures and worker interactions can be translated into potential hazards.
Additional details of how to identify and characterize hazards are provided in
the safety methodology employed for this analysis (2). The following is a
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comprehensive list of hazards associated with the tunnel borer system.
Hazards related to machinery failures are grouped by equipment type. Hazards
involving geologic or other environmental events are grouped separately.
1.	 Hazards Related to Machinery Failures and Associated Human Errors
at	 Tunnel Borer. Worker in a position to be struck by a
machine component as a reau t of:
o	 Other workers handling cutter discs, pumps/pump motors, muck
buckets, or support jack components during maintenance.
o	 Worker being required to handle a heavy machine component
while replacing or repairing it.
o	 Workers not using appropriate support equipment (such as
small hoists or carrying slings) when-handling heavy
components.
o Worker's physical capabilities being exceeded because of
weight or size of cutter discs, muck buckets, or support
jack components.
o	 Worker on wet or loose footing while handling cumbersome
machine components, and slipping or falling.
Worker in a position to be struck by a tool as a result of:
o	 Hydraulic jacks slipping or breaking while being used to
prop up the machine during rezlignment, or support jack
maintenance.
o	 Slippage or breakage of tools (such as wrenches, crowbars,
hammers, etc.) used for removing cutter discs, hydraulic
lines, muck buckets, or support jack components.
o	 Worker applying excessive force causing tool to slip or
break, or causing object worked on to break.
o	 Worker enkaged in maintenance (such as wrenches, hammers,
crowbars, etc.) dropping tool on self or other worker.
o	 Worker prying loose rock away from support pads or cleaning
up debris under tunnel borer and breaking or dropping the
pick or shovel.
Worker in a position to be struck by flying debris from object worked on
as a result of:
o	 Prying or moving loose rocks away from support pads or under
the cutting machine and being struck by rock fragments.
o	 Welding muck buckets, cutter discs., or support pad
components and being struck by hot metal fragments.
Worker in a position to slip or be knocked off balance as a result of:
o	 Handling cutter discs, muck buckets, or support jack
components on poor footing.
o	 Being struck by tool in the hands of other worker.
E
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o	 Performing cleanup around the tunnel borer and slipping or
tripping on debris.
o	 Being struck by roof, rib, or face slough.
Worker in a position to be struck by high pressure release from
machinery as a result of:
o	 Failure of hydraulic lines or seals in the control room
area, or while checking or replacing hydraulic lines and
fittings on the tunnel borer.
o	 A whipping hydraul ic line ruptured while performing
maintenance on pressure lines and fittings.
While performing maintenance or cleanup around the support jacks, worker
is in a position to be struck or caught by the miner as it advances.
Worker in a position to be in contact with an energized conductor as a
result of:
o	 Cleaning, checking, or troubleshooting the transformers.
o	 Cleaning the transformer terminals and checking for cable
lead corrosion or breakage.
Worker in a position to inhale coal dust as a result of operating the
borer, or performing maintenance and cleanup in the face area.
b.	 Roof Bolter. Worker in a position to be struck by a machine
component as result of:
o	 Handling or replacing the drill bit and dropping it.
o	 Handling roof bolt and dropping it.
o	 Roof bolter helper handling supplies and dropping them on
self or operator.
o	 Drill or roof bolt binding and breaking.
Worker in a position to be struck by a tool as a result of:
o	 Worker removing or tightening hydraulic fittings and wrench
slips or fitting breaks.
o	 Worker performing maintenance such as tightening drill or
replacing hydraulic lines and drops tool on self or roof
bolter helper.
o	 Worker prying down loose rock and crowbar slips or breaks.
Worker in a position to be struck by flying debris from object worked on
as a result of:
o	 Being struck by rock fragments during drilling.
o	 Worker barring down loose rock and is struck by rock
fragments.
Worker in a position to slip or be knocked off balance as a result of:
o	 Being struck by a broken drill segment or rock fragment.
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o	 Worker operating or moving roof bolters and slips on d-brie.
o	 Worker inadvert.,itly strikes another worker while handling
drill or roof bolts.
o	 Tool slipping while tightening drill or hydraulic fittings.
o	 Worker struck by rock fall.
Worker in a position to be struck by high pressure release from
machinery as a result of:
o	 Severed hydraulic lines, or improper repair or maintenance
of pressure lines and fittings.
o	 Impact by a whipping pressure line.
Worker in a position to be struck or caught by machinery as a result of:
o	 Being struck by the roof bolter while assisting the operator
in sliding the bolter on its track.
o	 Operator or helper's clothing being caught by rotating drill.
o	 Operator or helper te'ng caught by bolt plate while
installing and torquing roof bolt.
Worker in a position to inhale coal. or rock dust as a result of
respirable dust generated by miner, roof bolters, and conveyor.
C.	 Pneumatic Hoists. Worker in a position to be struck or
caught by equipment, or hoisted components, as a re,,ult of:
o	 Workers handling beam brackets, beams, track section, pipe,
or flexicore and dropping component on self or other worker.
o	 Hoist cables breaking and whipping, or load being dropped.
o	 Loss of system pressure causing boom to fall.
o	 Operator moving boom or load too quickly, impacting rib and
causing boom to collapse or load to fall.
o	 Operator not seeing workers in area and impacting workers
with boom or load.
Worker in a position to be struck by a tool as a result of:
o	 Worker replacing pressure lines and wrench slips or fitting
breaks.
o	 Worker replacing damaged pressure lines, or repairing boom,
and drops tool on self or on other workers.
Worker in a position to be struck by flying debris from object worked as
a result of worker performing weld repairs on boom and being struck by hot
metal fragments.
p Worker in a position to slip or be knocked off balance as a result of:
o	 Being struck by swinging boom or load.
L
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o Worker performing maintenance on elevated section of boat
and losing balance.
o Workers handling beam brackets, beams, pipe, track, or
flexic.ore and dipping after dropping component.
o Standing on curved rib while installing beats and pipe.
Worker in s position to be struck by high pressure release from
machinery as a result of:
o High pressure air from ruptured line or blown fitting.
o Impact by whipping pressure line.
d. Degasification and Rib Drills.	 Worker in a position to be
struck by a component as a result of: i
o Handling drill bit, or drill section, and dropping component
on self or other worker. 	 j
o Drill binding and breaking.	 i
o seam support bracket slipping while installing bolts.
o Being struck by falling hoist load while operating drills.
Worker in a position to be struck by a tool as a result of:
o Worker tightening drill or rib bolts and wrench slips or
breaks.
o Worker performing maintenance on drill and dropping tool on
self or other worker.
Worker in a position to be struck by flying debris from object worked on
as a result of flying rock fragments while drilling the rib.
Worker in a position to slip or be knocked off balance as a result of:
o	 Being struck by drill or fragment of broken drill.
o	 Being struck by the degasification drill while hoisting and
repositioning drill.
o	 Tool slipping while tightening drill.
o	 Being struck by hoist boom or falling hoist load while
operating drills.
o	 Standing on curved rib while operating .:rill and installing
beam support brackets.
Worker in an position to be struck or caught by machinery as a result of:
o	 Being struck by the degasification drill t::ile operating, or
repositioning drill using the hoist.
•	 Operator or helper's clothing being caught by rotating drill.
•	 Operator or helper being caught or pinched by rib bolt while
inserting and torquing.
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Worker in a position to be in contact with an energized conductor as a
result of:
o	 Checking for cable lead corrosion, or breakage.
o	 Cleaning and tightening terminal connections.
o	 Troubleshooting motor or electrical connection problems.
e.	 Shotcrete Machinery. Worker in a position to be struck by
machine component as a result of:
o	 Worker handling spray nozzles, mixer plates, or conveyor
components during maintenance and dropping them on self or
other worker.
Worker slipping on wet footing and dropping component on
-elf or other worker.
Worker iii a position to be struck by a tool as a result of:
o	 Workers using wrenches, hammers, etc., while replacing
nozzles, conveyor components, or mixer plates, and dropping
them on self or other worker.
o	 Worker applying excessive force while removing and replacing
components, or while removing residual concrete from hopper
and mixer, causing tool to slip or break or object worked on
to break.
o	 Worker unclogging hopper and mixer and being struck by
jammed tool.
o	 Worker performing cleanup of rebound off tunnel walls and
floor and dropping pick or shovel on self, or being struck
by tool while prying rebound loose.
Worker in a position to be struck by flying debris from object worked on
as a result of:
•	 Worker unclogging hopper and mixer and being struck by
flying shotcrete fragments.
•	 Workers prying rebound off walls or floor of tunnel and
being struck by flying shotcrete fragments.
Worker in a position to slip or be knocked off balance as a result of:
o	 Handling machine components on wet footing while performing
maintenance.
o	 Slipping on wet rebound while handling the hose and spray
nozzle.
o	 Performing cleanup and slipping on wet rebound.
o	 Being struck by tool in the hands of other workers while
E	 performing maintenance or cleanup.
o	 Carrying bags of concrete from supply cars to the batching
area, and slipping on poor footing.
o	 Being accidentally struck by nozzle spray.
o	 Being struck by ruptured shotcrete hose.
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Worker in a position to be struck by high pressure release from
machinery as a result of:
o	 High pressure release of shotcrete from ruptured hose or
burst fitting.
o	 Nozzle man not seeing other workers in the area, or losing
control of the nozzle because of recoil or pressure
fluctuations in the hose.
o	 Impact by whipping hose after line rupture.
o	 Nozzle man or helper being too close to spray surface and
being struck by rebound.
Worker in a position to inhale shotcrete or have shotcrete contact skin
as a result of:
o	 Shotcrete not being properly mixed resulting in respirable
dust and hardener suspended in the air.
o	 Being struck by shotcrete rebound.
o	 Opening cement bags, dumping cement in hopper, and mixing
concrete and hardener in open mixer.
o	 Not wearing adequate protective clothing when in the
shotereting area.
Worker in a position to be struck or caught by machinery as a result of:
o	 Unclogging operating hopper and mixer and catching loose
clothing or hands.
o	 Catching loose clothing or hands in moving conveyor.
Worker in a position to contact energized conductor as a result of
troubleshooting pump or motor drive problems, or checking and cleaning
electrical terminals.
f.	 Haulage Equipment. Worker in a position to be struck by a
machine component as a result of:
o	 Handling conveyor drive chain, rollers, or rail car
batteries during maintenance and dropping component on self
or other worker.
o	 Exceeding his physical capabilities because of the weight
and size of conveyor components or batteries.
o	 Slioping and falling on poor footing while handling
components.
Worker in a position to be struck by a tool as a result cf:
o	 Tools (such as wrenches, screwdrivers, hammers, etc., used
for maintenance on the conveyor drive chain, rollers,
adjusting belt tension, or removing battery cables) slipping
and striking worker or helper.
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o	 Tool slipping or breaking due to worker applying excessive
force.
i	 o	 Worker adjusting conveyor belt tension or drive chain
tension while belt is operating and catching tool in moving
machinery.
o	 Jacks or hoists used for rerailing rail cars or raising
track section slipping or breaking.
o	 Workers cleaning up spillage around conveyor, catching tool
in conveyor, and conveyor deflecting tool.
1	 o	 Worker dropping tool or striking helper with tool duringcleanup after derailment.
Worker in a position to be struck by flying debris from object worked on
as a result of:
o	 Workers cleaning up spillage around conveyor, rail cars, or
loading hopper and being struck by muck.
o	 Workers chipping away shotcrete from track while doing track
r
repairs.
Worker in a position to slip or be knocked off balance as a result of:
o	 Performing cleanup around hopper, conveyor, or rail cars and
slipping on bad footing.
o	 Being Struck by falling debris while cleaning up around
hopper.
o	 Being struck by tools such as shovels or jacks used for
cleanup and rerailing cars.
o	 Being struck by moving rail cars during track repair or
flexicore installation.
Worker in a position to be struck or caught by haulage machinery and
related components as a result of:
o	 Installing or repairing track and being struck by track
section, track, or rail ties.
o	 Being struck by moving or derailed cars while performing
track maintenance or installing flexicore.
o	 Rail car operator being pinched between car and rib during
derailment.
o	 Lubricating conveyor rollers and drive chain, or adjusting
belt tension, and catching loose clothing or hands in moving
machinery.
Worker in a position to contact an energized conductor as a result of:
o	 Replacing switches and batteries.
o	 Checking battery power output.
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Worker in a position to be burnt as a result of:
o	 Placing a tool across battery terminals.
o	 Ignition of hydrogen released while charging battery or
checking its water level.
2.	 Hazards Related to Geologic and Environmental Failures
a. Geologic Failures. Worker in a position to be struck by
roof, rib, or face rock as a result of:
o	 Performing maintenance on muck buckets or cutter discs, or
realigning the mining machine, in the face area.
o	 Performing cleanup around the tunnel borer support jacks in
the face area under unsupported roof.
o	 Roof bolters installing bolts or barring down loose rock
beyond point of last permanent support.
o	 Performing cleanup , -).intenance on first stage conveyor
and being struck by :;,one rock or shotcrete fragments that
fall with rock.
o	 Unusual geologic conditions encountered such as air, gas, or
water pockets under high pressure.
b. Environmental Failures. Tunnel borer operator and roof
bolters are in the area of methane release and:
o	 Poor ventilation causes gas buildup at face where tunnel
borer cutting operation generates sparks, causing gas
ignition and explosion.
o	 Gas :monitor fails to detect an excessive amount of gas
subsequently causing explosion.
o Degasification drill is deflected by hard parting in the
rock and intersects face area, allowing gas to leak into
cutting area, resulting in ignition.
o	 Workers are struck by flying rock fragments resulting from
explosion.
o	 Gas is ignited causing flammable hydraulic fluid to catch
fire, exposing workers to burns.
E.	 COMPARISON OF HAZARDS
As stated in the previous section, hazards related to the continuous
miner have been documented in MSHA injury data (S). Examining this historical
evidence and comparing it with the tunnel borer hazards reveals the
similarities and differences between the two systems. As shown in Section
II.B., the continuous miner system is basically composed of: (1) the
continuous miner, (2) the attached loader, (3) bridge conveyor or shuttle car,
(4) roof bolter, and (S) rail cars or fixed conveyor. The rail car component
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j	 of the system is exactly the same as the tunnel borer and therefore
experiences basically the same hazards associated with maintenance and
operation of this subsystem. One slight difference is that the continuous
miner system also usually employs additional rail cars operating off a trolley
line to assist in moving workers and supplies to and from the face. This
component demonstrates the same hazards related to impact by rail cars, with
the additional hazard of workers contacting the energized trolley wire.
Although the conveyor and roof bolter components are also employed in
the tunnel borer system, there are some substantial differences in the hazards
associated with this machinery. These differences stem from: (1) the
continuous miner bridge conveyor being located in the immediate working area,
and being capable of articulation, and (2) the roof bolter being a separate,
electrically powered machine. The tunnel borer conveyor is mounted overhead
and away from the normal working area. Therefore, workers experience the
hazards of being caught or struck by the conveyor only when doing periodic
maintenance or cleanup. However the continuous miner bridge conveyor, being
in the working area, exposes workers to these hazards constantly. The hazard
of being struck by the bridge conveyor is aggravated by the articulated design
feature. This is primarily because the bridge conveyor, in its articulated
mode of operation, is subject to rapid, jerky lateral movements. Since the
bridge conveyor moves with the continuous miner, it is often difficult to
determine what direction and distance each respective section of the conveyor
will travel.
Roof bolter hazards in a continuous miner section are aggravated because
workers are exposed to impact by the machine while it is tramming, moving in
position in the face area, or operating. The tunnel borer roof bolters are
integrated with the miner and constrained to move only in an arc; however, the
conventional roof bolter moves independently of the miner and is subject to
rapid, uncontrollable movement as a result of lateral forces imparted on the
bolter while drilling. Additionally, conventional roof bolters are
electrically powered and subsequently expose workers to electrical hazards
while handling the power cable or doing machine maintenance.
Both the tunnel borer and continuous miner systems employ transformers
and power cables to operate various equipment. Although the electrical
hazards are the same, the layout of the tunnel borer equipment places cables
in relatively undisturbed loations. Cable handling is a major task in the
continuous miner system because equipment is constantly moving and changing
positions. As a result, hazards associated with handling energized cables are
aggravated.
The continuous miner system does not employ pneumatic hoists,
degasification drill, or shotcrete machinery and, therefore, does not
experience hazards related to this machinery. Though workers performing
support activities in the continuous miner system do not install flexicore
components, they do handle similarly sized components such as beams, timber,
and temporary support jacks during the roof support operation. Consequently,
hazards associated with handling heavy, cumbersome components, and using
handtools to install these components, equally apply to both the tunnel borer
and continuous miner. Hazards related to maintenance of equipment (such as
tool hazards, electrical hazards, or handling machine components) also apply
to both systems. Since both systems employ hydraulics, the hazards of being
struck by a high pressure stream of fluid or whipping hose are the same. It
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appears, however, that these hazards are somewhat aggravated in the tunnel
borer system by the more extensive use of high pressure pneumatics and
hydraulics.
Although the hazards connected with the operation and maintenance of the
continuous miner are basically the same as the tunnel borer machine, certain
operational aspects of the coi^tinuous miner complicates the machinery
hazards. The complications arise fr:m the mobility of the continuous miner
and the location of the operator. The continuous miner is subject to rapid
backward, forward, and lateral movement. The rapid backward and forward
movement occurs while sumping and changing position. The lateral movement is
t	 usually caused by striking a hard parting in the coal seam. Additionally, the
operator is seated in a cab located on the side of the machine, thus reducing
his visibility of the work area opposite the cab. As a result, workers
installing temporary support, carrying supplies, or cable handling may be
struck by the miner. The operator is also exposed to being pinched between
the rib and cab, or struck by haulage machinery in the area, while leaning out
of the cab to back out or maneuver the miner. These hazards are not as acute
with the tunnel borer since the machine is: (1) considerably larger and
constrained to move in one direction, (2) slow moving, and (3) the operator
remotely controls the machine from the control room skid.
The shuttle car is the last piece of machinery in the continuous miner
system, but is not used in the tunnel borer system. The hazards normally
associated with this component are: (1) workers being struck by the machine
while working in the face area, (2) the shuttle car operator or helper being
pinched between the rib and vehicle while maneuvering, (3) the shuttle car
striking workers because the operator does not see them, (4) brake failure or
mechanical malfunction that causes the shuttle car to go out of control and
strike workers, and (5) the shuttle car going out of control after hitting an
obstacle, such as a fallen rock.
The hazards connected with geological and environmental failures are the
same for both systems. The major advantage of the tunnel borer stems from
joint use of roof bolts and shotcrete. Together these provide continuous roof
and rib support for the length of the entry. Additionally, the shotcrete
layer helps prevent gas seepage into the entry.
In summary, it appears that both systems experience the same hazards
associated with machinery and geological failures. The differences between
the two systems arise from the degree to which the various components of each
system complicate or intensify the respective hazards. For example, the
tunnel borer appears to reduce the magnitude of hazards related to geologic
failures, the conveyor, roof bolters, and electrical cables. At the same
time, the borer appears to intensify machinery hazards because of the
additional use of the degasification drill, hoists, and shotcrete machinery.
This suggests that the tunnel borer represents a greater source of machinery
hazards. Whether the tunnel borer can be considered as a viable replacement
system for the continuous miner will be a function of identifying design
elements that mitigate machinery and other hazards. Before performing the
quantitative evaluation, a qualitative analysis of the design, considering the
results of the hazard analysis, provides an indication of positive and
negative design elements. The qualitative design analysis is provided in the
following section. This analysis establishes the foundation for quantifying
design elements and projecting injuries later in the evaluation.
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SECTION IV
QUALITATIVE HEALTH AND SAFETY EVALUATION
A. OVERVIEW
The previous section established the hazards associated with the tunnel
borer sytem. The next step is to determine whether the design is basically
sound in terms of existing regulatory constraints, and whether the design
offers health and safety improvements that offset major hazards. This step is
a continuation of the qualitative evaluation begun in the hazard analysis. At
the completion of the qualitative evaluation, the regulatory integrity will
have been confirmed, and both the strong and weak points of the design
identified, thus, permitting an initial judgment about the likely health and
safety performance.
B. SELECTION OF AN ANALOGOUS SYSTEMS
In order to assess whether a new design meets the intent of current
regulations, it must be compared to a similar existing system. The Safety
Methodology (2) groups comparisons into two categories: systems that are
functionally similar, and systems that are nonfunctionally similar. The
distinction is as follows:
(1) Functionally similar systems operate in exactly the same
environment, in essentially the same fashion, and have similarly
structured components. For example, two longwall systems: one a
shearer, and the other a plow.
(2) Nonfunctionally similar systems have only one thing in common;
they both may either extract or haul coal. Nonfunctional
comparisons have totally different component structures and are
relevant only if the new technology is so different that a
functional comparison is unavailable, or if the new system is
intended to replace a conventional system that appears inherently
more hazardous.
At the onset of the study it was determined that the single-entry tunnel
borer system would be examined with the intent of replacing the conventional
continuous miner five-entry system. At the system level, evaluating the
continuous miner against the tunnel borer represents a nonfunctional
comparison. However, the ^cnveyor, rail car, and roof bolter components of
the tunnel borer system are state-of-the-art technology employed in
conventional mining and can, therefore, be compared on a functionally similar
basis. Although other tunnel borer system components such as the hoists, rib
and degas drills, and shotcrete machinery are not usually employed in coal
mining, functionally similar components exist in the tunneling industry. The
tunneling industry, therefore, provides an additional basis for comparison of
regulatory conformance.
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C.	 TEST OF REGULATORY CONFORMANCE
The regulatory evaluation of the tunnel borer system is simplified by
the fact that the system is essentially a different application of
state-of-the-art hardware. As noted in Section II, the tunnel borer is a
modified version of a Caldweld boring machine, which is used for tunneling and
driving slopes. Consequently, the machine already meets existing tunneling
regulations established by OSHA. The following modifications to the machine
were necessary to meet MSHA safety regulations:
(1) Installation of ventilation fans on the boring machine to ensure
that a minimum air flow of 9000 ft 3 /min is provided at the face.
(2) Installation of a water spray system for dust abatement.
(3) Installation of roof bolters on the machine to provide permanent
roof support in accordance with the Title 30 (MSHA Safety
Regulations) bolting regulations.
(4) Demonstration that the power transformer on the control skid
properly interrupts if struck by a rock fall (this was done by
on-site testing).
(5) Addition of a tunnel divider to provide a minimum of two entries,
one for intake air and the other for exhaust.
Dust collection systems were added to the bolters to improve dust
control at the face. Other equipment such as the conveyor and rail cars, and
roof bolters are standard coal mining equipment and, thus, meet MSHA
regulations.
Although the rib and degasification drills, and shotcrete machinery are
standard tunneling equipment and conform to OSHA safety standards, they had to
be slightly modified to include spark arrestors to conform with MSHA
regulations. The hoists, being pneumatically powered, already meet the spark
arrest regulations.
OSHA and MSHA safety regulations applicable to safe load limits,
canopies (falling object protection), and design of high pressure vessels and
lines are equivalent. Since all of the above equipment is already in use, it
readily conforms to these regulations. Consequently, when equipped with the
modifications indicated in the preceding discussion, the tunnel borer system
appears to be a sound design. This would be expected since the prototype
design was completed.
`	 D.	 EVALUATION OF HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS
f
Having verified the regulatory integrity of the tunnel borer, the above
`	 analysis does not appear to indicate any inherent flaws requiring redesign.
This finding represents the first positive design element of the system. The
last positive design element stems from the ability of the design to mitigate
the hazards listed in Section III. There are many ways workers may be injured
while performing various tasks. As some kinds of exposure may be more
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important than others, the design has a great effect on reducing exposure to
hazards. In comparison with the continuous miner, the tunnel borer should
demonstrate some design improvements in the hazard areas that presently
contribute most to serious injuries. The results of the hazard analysis
suggested that both systems experienced varying degrees of exposure to hazards
associated with: (1) roof, face, or rib falls, (2) haulage, (3) machinery,
(4) handling materials, (5) explosion and fire, (6) electricity, (7) slips and
falls, (8) hand tools, and (9) pressure release. The first four of the
general accident classes represent the major sources of serious injuries in
contemporary underground mining, and therefore deserve the most attention when
examining design improvements (2). There are also several health hazards
associated with contemporary mining which must be addressed in evaluating a
new design. The chief hazard centers around dust, and other carcinogenic,
mutagenic, or toxic substances found in the mining environment (i.e., ammonia,
other minerals deposited in the coal, and chemicals used while mining) (7).
Other secondary hazards include: (1) temperature and humidity extremes which
aggravate respiratory diseases such as bronchitis and asthma, (2) noise, (3)
poor lighting, (4) cramped working space which adds to psychological stress,
and (5) machinery vibration (7).
New concepts can reduce exposure to hazards by either reducing the time
workers are exposed to hazards, or by providing more protection (13).
Exposure time can be reduced through machinery redesign (i.e., machinery that
performs a task more quickly so that workers are exposed to a given hazard for
a s;;orter period of time), removal of hazardous tasks or machinery from the
systeti, or decrease of the labor force exposed (2). Protection can be
provid-d through machinery redesign (i.e., design equipment to provide a
barrier against hazards), and provide monitoring devices to warn workers of
impending hazards (2).
The Safety Methodology provided several examples of design improvements
in all of the above areas as guidelines for determining the merit of a new
system. In the first major hazard area, roof, face, or rib falls, the
continuous miner system historically shows a high incidence of serious
injuries related to: (1) operating the miner, bolter, and haulage in the face
area, and (2) setting temporary support and testing the roof for instability.
The tunnel borer affects both exposure time and protection through the
following design characteristics which are in line with the proposed
guidelines:
(1) Better roof stress distribution as a result of the circular entry
design (increase in protection).
(2) Integration of the roof bolter with the miner to reduce the amount
of time between excavation and bolting so as to reduce stress
buildup in the strata (exposure time reduction and more
protection).
(3) Location of permanent roof bolts 12 ft from the face versus the
present 20 ft from the face (increase in protection).
(4) Application of shotcrete t ,j the tunnel roof and walls to provide
additional roof support and prevent entry weathering which causes
sloughing (increase in protection).
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(5) Use of flexicore which provides an additional barrier against roof
falls (increase in protection).
(6) Heavy-duty canopy protection for the roof bolters (increase in
protection).
(7) Placment of the operator under a protective structure and remote
operation of the miner (increase in protection).
(8) Elimination of the need to place temporary support at the face,
except during maintenance (exposure time reduction).
The haulage accident class historically demonstrates a high incidence of
injuries related to workers being struck by shuttle cars, being pinched
between the machine and rib while the machine is maneuvering in the face area,
and being struck or caught by the conveyor. One of the proposed design
improvements to reduce these hazards is to provide adequate working and
maintenance space around equipment. The tunnel borer design responds
favorably to this guideline by:
(1)	 Eliminating the need for shuttle cars (exposure time reduction).
k2)	 Placing the conveyor overhead and away from the working area
(exposure time reduction and more protection).
(3)	 Laying out the equipment in a straight line in order that the
conveyor and track haulage do not interfere with other equipment
and cannot change position or route; thus, workers always know
where the haulage equipment is (increase in protection).
The largest portion of serious machinery injuries is attributed to
workers being struck by machinery in the process of operating, moving or
tramming eqmipment at the face. This is primarily because of: (1) the high
degree of mobility of equipment such as continuous miners and roof bolters,
(2) the difficulty of controlling this equipment when it strikes hard partings
in the coal, and (3) poor lighting. The tunnel borer system responds to these
problems in the following manner:
(1) Workers are provided better lighting in the work areas (increase
in protection).
(2) The roof bolter is integrated with the miner and constrained in
its movement, therefore removing the need to change and maneuver
machinery in the face area (exposure time reduction and more
protection).
(3) Workers are generally removed from the miner while it is operating
(increase in protection).
i
(4) The miner is more stable and moves very slowly (increase in
protection).
Serious injuries related to handling material have historically centered
around workers handling objects which, by their weight or size, exceed a
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worker's physical capabilities. one important design guideline provided in
this area is the incorporation of appropriate support equipment to assist in
the handling and positioning of cumbersome objects. The tunnel borer conforms
to this guideline by providing hoists to help move and position beam, pipe,
track, and flexicore. This is clearly a protective feature. 	 last areas
where the tunnel borer offers design improvements are explosion, electrical,
and slip and fall hazards. Historically, these accident classes have been
aggravated by: (1) gas intrusion and buildup in the face area, (2) workers
handling energized cables, and (3) poor lighting and poor footing. The tunnel
borer reduces exposure to hazards associated with these accident classes
through the following respective features:
(1) Degasification of the coal seam in advance of the miner (increase
in protection).
(2) Lower cutter head speed to prevent sparking (increase in
protection).
(3) Layout of equipment so that workers do not have to worry about
constantly moving electrical cables out of the way of other
equipment (exposure time reduction).
(4) Placement of the main power cable in a safe location away from
most moving equipment and the working areas (increase in
protection).
(5) Improved lighting in all the work areas (increase in protection).
Design features that offset health hazards are examined in the same
fashion as the safety attributes (7). The four major ways of mitigating
health hazards are through: (1) remote operation (workers do not come in
contact with hazards); (2) system redundancy (the system has several ways of
controlling a hazard, or the system continues operating and workers interface
with the system only when the environment is cleared of dust, etc.); (3) fail
safe, or early hazard detection devices (workers are apprised of a hazard well
before allowable exposure levels are exceeded); and (4) protection (workers
work in an unhealthy environment but are provided protection which offsets
hazards) (7). In the case of the primary hazards of dust and other mutagenic
or toxigenic substances, the tunnel borer system has both positive and
negative characteristics. Better control of dust is accomplished through the
following:
(1) A high ventilation rate at the face.
(2) Water sprays at the face.
(3) A spelling cutting technique, which cuts larger fragments and
reduces airborne dust.
A negative characteristic is the use of shotcrete, which employs both
cement and a toxic epoxy hardener. Because no control technology is employed
to offset the airborne dust and hardener, workers can inhale these mutagenic
and toxic substances.
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Other design improvementb offered by the tunnel borer center around 	 4;!
lighting and working space. As stated in Section II, the tunnel borer uses a
large number of 30-W fluorescent lights both on machinery and throughout the
complete length of the tunnel. In addition, a minimum vertical clearance of
ten feet between the floor and tunnel divider is provided. Though the
immediate area around the flexicore hoist and rail cars is slightly
restricted, the space just forward of the hoist, including the operator's
skid, provides substantial room for the crew.
The remaining health hazards related to temperature and humidity
extremes, noise, and machine vibration. are not mitigated by the tunnel borer
system design to any greater extent than existing underground mining systems.
In summary, it appears that several health and safety aspects of the
tunnel borer design have reasonable merit, and warrant further investigation.
At the same time, the results of the hazard analysis and the design
comparisons can not be overlooked. As shown in Sections II and III, the
tunnel borer not only requires twice the crew size as the continuous miner,
but also requires additional tasks and machinery not part of the continuous
miner system. the question that must be answered in the quantitative phase,
is whether the design attributes presented in the preceding discussion have
sufficient impact on mitigating major hazards so as to offset the potentially
higher exposure affixed to the larger number of workers, tasks, and machinery
employed.
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SECTION V
QUANTITATIVE SAFETY EVALUATION
A.	 OVERVIEW
The quantitative safety evaluatiou is a projection of injuries drawing
on distinct exposure time data, risk populations, and the design improvements
(and liabilities) surfaced in the previous section. The main thrust of this
portion of the analysis is to project the fatality, disabling injury, and
overall injury rates for the tunnel borer system, compare them with continuous
miner rates, and with the safety requirements for advanced systems. To be
considered an advanced system, the tunnel borer overall projected injury rate
should not exceed 40 to 45 injuries per million manhours, and the disabling
injury and fatality rates should not exceed 30 and 0.2 injuries per million
r anhours, respectively.
The component of the injury rate projection, dealing with the influence
of exposure time, utilizes: (1) an exposure time index which is the ratio of
tunnel borer task exposure time, to either continuous miner or tunneling
industry task exposure time, (2) the ratio of the respective populations at
risk for a given task and hazard, and (3) the historical continuous miner and
tunneling industry injuries associated with a given task and hazard (2). The
historical injuries are multiplied by the exposure time index and the risk
population ratio to determine the projected tunnel borer injury rate for the
commensurate tasks and hazards (2).
The component of the injury rate projection dealing with the influence
of bodily protection, involves a detailed examination of the protective
device, followed by a subjective rating of the effect the protective measure
will have on reducing injuries associated with the analogous conventional
system. The new system must offer complete protection for the body areas that
are most exposed and have the most severe injuries in order to be judged as a
sound design (2). The ratings are respectively: (1) complete or fairly
complete protection (a protective envelope is provided, thereby mitigating all
or most hazards), (3) incomplete protection (those areas of the body which
contribute most to serious injuries are still exposed a large part of the
time), and (4) no protection (the new system offers protection less than or
equal to existing systems, not mitigating hazards that contribute to existing
injury levels at all).
Both exposure time and protection injury projections, as they apply to
the various hazards and design elements, are presented to a group of experts
in mining safety for the last aspect of the analysis. The experts are asked
to adjust the injury rates in light of the exposure time and risk population
data, degree of protection provided, and their own experience with how these
parameters effect injuries. The adjusted projections are displayed as a range
reflecting all the experts' inputs and represent the final projected injury
rates for the tunnel borer system.
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B.	 DATA INPUTS TO THE INJURY PROJECTION
1. Injury Data
The source of the bulk of the historical data used in the analysis
is the MSAA Report CM 341L2, (Injury by Worker Activity) (S). To get a
reasonable sample of characteristic injuries associated with continuous
mining, four years of data (1976 through 1979) were averaged. In many cases,
distinct injuries related to continuous miner activities were specifed in the
various accident classes. For those activities typical of contemporary mining
practice, but not specifically identified with continuous mining, the average
percent contribution of continuous mining to total yearly underground mining
injuries (i.e., 602) was used following the suggestion provided in the safety
evaluation procedure (2)4
Tunneling industry injury data were used for the hoist, degasification
and rib drill, and shotcrete elements of the tunnel borer system. These
historical injury data were obtained from the ureau of Reclamation in Denver,
Colorado (12). Again, a representative baseline for injury levels associated
with the above equipment was obtained by averaging the data for 1976 through
1979.
2. Task Time Datn
Worker activities for both the tunnel borer and continuous miner
systems were described during the discussion of system operation and worker
interactions with hazards. Reductions in the time that workers are exposed to
hazards, while operating and maintaining machinery or performing support tasks
such as cleanup or ground control, are essential to improved injury
performance. For example, the ideal situation would be to remove a worker
from hazardous tasks via automation or remote operation, causing the exposure
time to drop tc zero. Since the tunnel borer system is not an automated
system, an evaluation of the exposure time is more complex. The qualitative
evaluation suggested that workers could potentially experience both reductions
and increases in exposure time compared with continuous mining, therefore
requiring a more detailed task time analysis to assess aggregate exposure. In
suppport of this assessment, task time data for the tunnel borer system were
obtained from the Bureau of Mines industrial engineering studies performed
during system design (6). Some additional task and maintenance time data were
also obtained during operation of the prototype. These studies established
task schedules and manpower requirements for a normal 8-h hour shift. The
major tasks included, (1) tunnel borer operating time (2) roof bolting time,
(3) rail track assembly time, (4) track laying time, (S) water pipe
installation time, (6) beam installation time, (7) beam punching time, (8)
flexicore installation time, (9) cleanup time, (10) shotcreting time, (11)
degasifications time, (12) rail car operating time, and (13) conveyor
operating time. Generally speaking, detailed machine maintenance data were
not available from the industrial engineering studies or observation of the
prototype. Machine maintenance times typical of each of the equipment
components were obtained through discussion with one of the machine users, and
the two machine manuffcturer4 (9, 10, 11). Task times for the equivalent
continuous miner tasks, listed in Appendix A of the safety evaluation
procedure, were extracted from an industrial engineering study of continuous
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mining, performed by J. J. Davis Associates (2, 14). Table 5-1 displays the
task times for both the tunnel borer and continuous miner systems. Where
there is no continuous miner task analogous to the tunnel borer, the relevant
tunneling industry task is used (e.g., shotcreting).
Examination of Table 5-1 shows that in many cases (such as operating the
miner, conveyor, rail cars or trolley, hoists, large drills, and shotcrete
machinery) the exposure is approximately the same for both systems. Similarly
the exposure is equivalent for certain maintenance and support tasks. This
finding is reasonable because both systems employ state-of-the-art machinery
and therefore require similar maintenance and support activities. Exposure
reductions for the tunnel borer are clearly evident because the shuttle car
operation, cable reeling and handling, and temporary support activities are
removed or greatly reduced. Increases in exposure are related to the roof
bolting, cleanup, and handling material activities. As expected, exposure
times associated with cleanup and handling material activities are consider-
ably higher than the continuous miner. Exposure during roof bolting is higher
because of the integrated miner-bolter design. This design eliminates the
tramming and positioning time associated with the conventional roof bolter and
allows more actual bolting time.
The exposure indices are formed by taking the ratio of the tunnel borer
task time to the continuous miner (or tunneling) task time. Often the exposure
index is formed from the direct ratio of singular tasks in Table 5-1. However,
in order to have the worker interactions and hazards identified in the tunnel
borer hazard analysis conform with the way the MSHA injury data are reported
for the equivalent continuous miner worker activities and hazards, it is
sometimes necessary to form the exposure index from groups of tasks, or from
components of the tasks listed in Table 5-1.
3.	 Manpower Data
The manpower requirements for both systems are summarized in
Section 11-D. As in the case of the task time analysis, detailed manpower
requirements were extracted from the same industrial engineering studies and
tunneling industry experience (6, 9, 10, 11, 14). Table 5-2 displays the
respective detailed manpower allocations as a function of the same basic tasks
provided in Table 5-1.
Table 5-2 confirms the conclusion drawn earlier in Section 11, namely,
that the tunnel borer is considerably more labor-intensive than the continuous
miner system. Significant differences are evident in the shotcreting and bull
gang crew sizes. These two crews are a factor of 3 to 5 greater than the total
number of people employed in similar continuous miner tasks. Note that though
the continuous miner and tunnel borer systems imploy a hub of 11 or 12, and 22
workers respectively, many workers perform multiple tasks. Therefore, as
workers move from one work area to another, they can be exposed to different
hazards. This is considered later during the injury projection phase.
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Table 5-1. Exposure Time Comparison between the Tunnel Borer
and Continuous Miner Systems
Continuous Miner or
Tunneling Industry ( a ) Tunnel Borer
Activities Task Time (manhours/shift) Task Time (manhours/shift)
Operating and Moving
Machinery
Mining machine and loader 3 3 to 4
y
Conveyor 3 3 to 4
Docking and loading 1.6 0
Shuttle cars
Tramming shuttle cars 2 0
Trolley moves workers 2 0
and supplies to face area
Rail cars (muck and supplies) 	 3 (1 train) 5 (1 coal train
and 1 supply
train)
Roof bolters 1.6 4
Pneumatic hoists 9 (two hoists 9 (two hoists
operated) a operated)
Large rib or face 3 to 4a 3.4
drills (degasification
drill)
Shotcreting 5 to 6a 5.75
Maintenance
Excavator and loader 2.3 2.5	 (0.5 to	 1	 for
cutter head)
One Roof bolter 1 0.4 (2 bolters)
Conveyor 0.7 0.75
One Shuttle car 0.7 0
Rail cars 0.5 0.5
Lay/repair track
t.
3 3
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Table 5-1. (Cont'd)
Continuous Miner or
Tunneling Industry ( a )	 Tunnel Borer
Activities	 Task Time (manhrs/shift) Task Time (manhrs/shift)
R `-
Pneumatic hoists
Degasification/rib drills
Shotcrete machinery
Weld repairs on machinery
Support Activities
Environmental checks of gas
and dust levels
Setting brattice
Cleanup around machinery
- Excavator
- Loader or loading hopper
- Conveyor
- Shotcrete rebound and
building materials
Cable reeling & moving for the
- miner
- haulage
- roof bolter
Setting temporary support,
testing and marking the roof,
barring down loose material
0.5a
	
0.5
0.7-0.8a
	
0.75
la
	
1
0.8
	
0.8
0.25
	
0.25
0.5
	
0
0.4
	
0.4
0.5
	
0.25
0.5
	
0.25
0
	
4.75
1.4 0
1.7 0
0.1 0
5.2 0.3 (mostly
barring
down loose
material)
Handling and moving materials
	
6	 11.8
such as temporary support,
beams, timber, brattice, stop-
pings, track, gob, roof bolts,
pipe, flexicore, etc.
Outby support activities
	
4	 1
such as replacing old
cribbing and rebuilding
stoppings,barring down rib
slough, drilling and punch-
ing beams, storing supplies; etc.
Supervision by foreman	 5.6	 5.6
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Table 5-2.	 Detailed Manpower Comparison Between the Tunnel Borer and
Continuous Miner Systems
Continuous Miner or Tunnel Borer
Activities Tunneling (a ) Manpower
Manpower
Operating and Moving
Machinery
Miner and loader 2 1
Conveyor 1 1
Shuttle car operators 2 (1 per car) 0
Shuttle car helpers 2 (1 per car) 0
Rail or Trolley cars 2 2
Roof bclter operators 1-2 (single or 2
dual boom)
Roof bolter helper
	
1
Pneumatic hoists
	
2 (1 per hoist)a
1
2 0 bull gang
member per
hoist)
Large rib or face
Drills (degasification drill)
Shotcreting
- Continuous mining
- Tunneling industry
Maintenance
Machinery
Track repair
SucDort Activities
2a
	
2
0
4-5a
	
5
2	 2
2	 2 (part of bull
gang)
Environmental checks
	
1	 1
of gas and dust
Cleanup around machinery	 2	 2
Cable reeling	 l	 0
Temporary support	 2	 0
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Table 5-2. (Cont'd)
Continuous Miner or	 Tunnel Borer
Activities	 Tunneling ( a ) Manpower
Manpower
Setting brattice 	 2 (temporary support	 0
or cleanup team)
Handling materials such as	 2-3 (temporary support 	 5 (bull gang)
temporary support, beams,
	 teaL1 and cleanup team)
timber, track, pipe, flexicore,
etc.
Outby support activities 	 4-5
	
2 (part of bull
gang)
Supervision
	
1	 1
4.	 Subjective Ratings of Protective Measures
Several types of protective measures were identified in the
qualitative evaluation. In addition, the ratings for various protective
measures were provided in the preceding overview. These ratings range from
"complete protection" to "no protection", in recognition of the degree of
protection afforded those areas of the body which historically experience the
most serious injuries (2). The areas of the body most affected by roof, rib,
or face falls are the head, trunk, arms and hands, and lower extremities. In
contemporary haulage accidents, the trunk is affected the most, followed by
the arms, hands and head. These are typically pinch and squeeze type
injuries. Serious machinery injuries have the greatest effect on the arms and
hands, followed by the trunk and lower extremities. These injuries generally
involve being caught or struck by machinery. In handling material accidents,
the arms and hands typically receive the most serious injuries, followed by
injuries to the trunk and lower extremities. Severe injuries in this accident
class are primarily the result of dropping materials, or being struck or
pinched while moving or positioning components. Electrical injuries,
primarily a result of arcing and shock during maintenance activities, usually
affect thc. eyes, arms, and hands. In slips and falls, the lower extremities
suffer the greatest amount of injuries, followed by the trunk, arms, and
hands. Explosion and fire injuries have the most severe effect on the head,
and to a lesser extent, the trunk, arms, and hands. Pressure bursts are often
encountered while performing maintenance and, 'Uhus, affect the eyes and head
the most, followed by the trunk, arms, and hands. As stated in the overview,
a protective measure must provide a complete protective envelope to be
considered totally effective. If a new design succeeds in establishing a
protective barrier around the worker, exposure time is no longer an issue.
However, protection judged as anything less than complete implies that workers
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are still exposed to hazards in varying degrees. In these cases, exposure
time increases c.,uld offset any protection offered and must subsequently be
carefully considered in any projections. Trade-offs between protection and
exposure time, as they affect injury rates, are considered during the injury
adjustment process performed by the group of experts. Table 5-3 provides the
author's initial effectiveness ratings based on a closer scrutiny of the
protective measures identified in the qualitative evaluation.
a. Protection Against Rock Falls. Those design features that
provide "complete protection are readily apparent because either there is a
substantial barrier between the worker and hazard, or the design allows for
the task to be accomplished remotely. The other ratings are not as
clear-cut. In the case of the roof fall hazard associated with the roof
bolters, a "fairly complete" rating was given because the heavy-duty canopy
grating would protect the head, trunk, and lower extremities; but not the arms
and hands. Workers would still have their arms and hands exposed in the gap
in the grating, which allows the roof bolters to slide on their tracks. This
gap provides room for changing drill bits, inserting bolts, or barring down
loose rock. An "incomplete" rating was assigned to protection against falls
of ground while engaged in maintenance because: (1) workers would have their
arms and hands exposed while maintaining the roof bolters, and (2) workers
would have all key body areas exposed while working in the face area on the
cutterhead and the support jacks. A "fairly complete" rating was assigned to
protection against cleanup hazards because the borer itself would provide
protection while cleaning up under the machine. The only exception would
apply to cleaning up around the side thrust jacks.
b. Protection Against Haulage and Other Machinery Hazards. In
the haulage accident class, workers drilling the rib for beam installation run
a small risk of being struck by muck cars, or rail cars bringing in supplies.
Under n.ost conditions, the layout of the equipment places the drilling
activity well ahead the rail car operation, thus providing fairly complete
protection.
A "fairly complete" rating was assigned to protection against machinery
hazards pertinent to workers being struck doing cleanup because the design
allows workers to generally stay out of the way of the tunnel borer. The roof
bolter configuraton was judged as providing "fairly complete" protection
because only the arms and hands are left exposed to minor injury.
The hoists used for moving and positioning the beams, pipe, track and
flexicore were rated as "incomplete" because of all the manual handling still
required while attaching hoist cables and installing the components.
Consequently, all the body components which suffer the most severe injuries
are still exposed during the bulk of the task time.
c. Protection Against Explosion, Electrical, and Other
Hazards. The protective measures which offset the explosion and electrical
hazards associated with moving equipment, were considered "fairly complete"
because workers are provided protection for the key body areas most of the
time. However, these measures do not set up a complete protective envelope
i
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Table 5-3. Ratings for Tunnel Borer Protective Measures
Initial
Protective	 Effectiveness
Accident Class/Hazard	 Measures	 Rating
Roof/face/rib falls
Struck while operating
excavator
• Remote operation
• Roof bolts
• Shotcrete
• Circular entry design
• Canopy on control
room skid
Complete
Struck while operating 	 o Heavy-duty canopy	 Fairly complete
roof bolter	 completely encloses
bolting stations
o Permanent support placed
immediately and closer
to face
Struck while operating 	 o Conveyor is remotely 	 Complete
haulage in face area	 operated and monitored
from control room skid
• Roof bolts
• Shotcrete
• Circular entry design
Struck while operating rail	 o Shotcrete	 Complete
cars or riding equipment	 o Circular entry design
o Roof bolts
o Flexicore panels
Struck while performing
	
o Shotcrete	 Incomplete
maintenance on equipment	 o Circular entry design
o Roof bolts
o Flexicore panels
o Canopies on skids
Struck while performing
	
o Continuous gas monitoring Complete
environmental checks	 mounted on boring machine
in-between equipment moves
Struck while performing clean- o Circular entry design 	 Fairly complete
up around excavator and 	 o Roof bolts located closer
conveyor	 to face
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Table 5-3. (Cont'd)
Initial
Protective	 Effectiveness
Accident Class /Hazard	 Measures	 Rating
Haulage
Struck while operating or	 o Conveyor mounted overhead, Complete
articulating conveyor 	 away from work areas
Struck while drilling face	 o Equipment layout	 Fairly complete
or rib
Struck while performing clean- o Conveyor is not articu- 	 Incomplete
up or maintenance in area of	 lated and not subject
operating conveyor 	 to rapid lateral movement
Machinery
Operator or helper struck, 	 o Remote operation of	 Complete
or pinched between rib and	 miner
machine, while operating
miner
Worker struck while doing	 o Tunnel borer constrained 	 Fairly complete
cleanup around machinery	 to move in one direction
and is not subject to rapid
movements
o Machinery layout does not
allow for other machinery to
be in same working area
o Improved lighting
Workers struck while tramming o Roof bolters integrated 	 Fairly complete
and operating roof bolters	 with boring machine
o Roof bolters constrained
to slide on track
Workers struck by other equip- o Conveyor located overhead Complete
ment in area of bridge
	
away from other machinery
conveyor
Handling Materials
r^	 Workers struck or pinched 	 o Hoists provided to assist 	 Incomplete
t	
while handling supplies, or 	 in moving and position-
laying and repairing track	 ing components
r
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Table 5-3. (Cont'd)
Initial
Protective	 Effectiveness
Accident Class/Hazard 	 Measures	 Rating
Explosion
Workers burned, or struck 	 o Degasification of coal	 Fairly complete
by flying debris, due to
ignition of methane gas in 	 o Slower cutting head rate
face area	 reduces sparking
o Shotcrete lining and
ventilation
Electrical
Workers are tramming
or moving equipment and
contact frayed cable
Workers performing clean-
up, or handling conducting
materials, and contact frayed
cable
Slip and Fall
Workers slip and fall while
guiding excavator or con-
veyor during position change
o Cable hung on rib and	 Fairly complete
removed from working
areas
o Equipment layout
o Cable hung on rib,	 Incomplete
away from working areas
o Equipment layout
o Miner remotely operated	 Complete
o Conveyor out of working
area
Workers slip and fall while	 o More adequate lighting	 Incomplete
performing cleanup, maint-
enance, or handling materials
around workers. The hazard associated with contacting a frayed cable during
cleanup, or handling materials, was regarded as being only marginally affected
by the protective measures. This was because all of the key body areas would
be exposed to a cable damaged by Shotcrete blast or a swinging beam, or
severed while cleaning up rebound. Similarly, the added protection against
slips and falls provided by the improved lighting was judged "incomplete".
This rating stemmed from workers experiencing an increase in exposure during
the extensive handling material tasks. These hazards are aggravated by
elevated work stations and obstacles on the tunnel floor, all of which
contribute to falls and serious injury.
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C.	 INJURY PROJECTIONS
With the required data now in hand, it is possible to proceed with the
injury projections. At this time it is appropriate to review the formula and
variables as they appear in the safety evaluation procedure (2):
ni = Ni ti/Ti figi
where
ni = the projected injuries for a given task i and hazard in the
new system (injuries/yr).
Ni = the total number of injuries associated with a given task i
and hazard of the contemporary system used as a comparison
(injuries/yr).
ti/Ti = the measure of the fractional change in task exposure time
between the new (ti) and contemporary comparison (Ti)
systems (dimensionless).
fi = the manpower ratio for a given task i and hazard of the new
and contemporary comparison systems (dimensionless).
gi = the injury adjustment factor, which reflects the consensus of
the group of experts pertaining to the safety integrity of the
new system (expressed as a fractional change in injuries).
Because expert judgment is not incorporated until the end of the analysis, the
initial projection is made with a value of unity assigned to the expert
adjustment factor. The same variable related to protective measures is
assigned qualitative values of large, medium, or small, relative to the
projected affect on reducing injuries. Later, during the consultation with
experts, this variable is given a numerical value. The expression for
consideration of protective aspects of a new design is as follows:
bj	 Bjdj
where
b j
 = the injury projection considering the incorporation of new
protective design measures for a given hazard and accident class j
(injuries/yr).
Bj = the aggregate number of historical injuries to the body (or the
initial exposure time injury projection) for a given hazard and
accident class (injuries/yr).
dj
 = the general consensus of the group of experts pertaining to the
integrity of the new protective device (expressed as a fractional
change in injuries).
The above definition of Bj indicates that the initial exposure time injury
projection can also be represented by this term. This substitution can occur
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if the initial injury projection is affected by both an exposure time
reduction and an increase in protection, in which case the protection can
cause a further decrease in injuries.
The injury projection is made for yearly fatalities (F), disabling
injuries (DI), and nondisabling injuries (NDI). The initial injury
projection, excluding the input from the experts, reflects both exposure time
and protection aspects. For example, if a given activity/hazard combination
experiences both an exposure time reduction and a fairly complete protective
measure, then the projection would reflect a reduced injury level due to the
numerically smaller exposure index, and have a "less than" term associated
with it to reflect the additional injury reduction expected from the
protective device. In the case of complete protection, exposure time does not
enter the picture and a "much less than" term is assigned to the injury
projection. An "incomplete" rating on a protective measure has no affect on
the projected injuries. The following example demonstrates the basic
numerical process. The hazard of being struck by a rock fall while :eating or
barring down roof, and roof bolting is a good example of both an exposure time
reduction and protection improvement. The exposure time ratio, applying the
task times from Table 5-1, is calculated as follows:
o	 The time spent roof bolting, setting temporary support, marking the
roof, and barring down loose rock for continuous mining is the
total of 1.6 and 5.2 manhours per shift, respectively; or, 6.8
total manhours per shift.
o	 The time spent roof bolting and barring down loose rock for the
tunnel borer is 4 and 0.3 manhours per shift, respectively; or, 4.3
total manhours per shift.
o	 The task time ratio is then 4.3/6.8, or 0.6.
The manpower ratio is unity since manning levels are the same. The projection
for disabling injuries would be as follows:
ni = Ni
 ti/Ti fi gi
where
N i
	309 injuries/yr
t i /Ti	0.6
f.	 1i
gi1
then
n i
 = (309)(0.6)(1)(1)
ni s
 185 disabling injuries/yr
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FThe protective canopy was rated as "fairly complete", so the above injury
projection would be stated as "less than 185 disabling injuries".
This projection technique examines hazard/activity combinations in
sufficient depth to separate the high and low contributors to injuries.
Because the primary concern is to eliminate major hazards, the following
tables thus display projections for the hazards that account for the largest
portion of the total injuries in each accident class. More detailed injury
and hazard data are given in Appendix A. {there protective measures do not
enter in the projection, the term "not applicable" (N/A) is placed in the
table column which indicates the effect of the protection.
1. Roof, Face, and Rib Fall Injuries
Table 5-4 shows that the tunnel borer demonstrates the greatest
improvement in the area of setting temporary support and roof bolting.
Although more time is spent bolting, the hazardous task of setting temporary
support is totally eliminated. Additionally, the protection-provided the
bolters further offsets injuries. The exposure time reduction related to the
maintenance hazard stems from exposing workers only while working on the
cutter head and first stage conveyor. All other maintenance is done under
complete protection. Operation of the tunnel borer is removed from the face
in a completely protected location. The cleanup activity in the immediate
face area requires less time and is also done under the protection of the
boring machine most of the time. Another major improvement is in the
elimination of manned haulage from the tai..e area.
2. Haulage Injuries
The major improvements indicated in Table 5-5 revolve around the
elimination of the loader and shuttle cars. Other hazards that contribute
significantly to haulage injuries are derailments, rerailing cars, or being
struck while getting on and off cars. However, the tunnel borer system offers
no improvements in any of these areas.
3. Machinery Injuries
The machinery improvements shown in Table 5-6 have a more complex
impact on injuries than those associated with haulage or rock falls. The
hazards associated with these improvements are: (1) being struck while doing
cleanup, and (2) being struck while roof bolting. In both cases the tunnel
borer increases exposure time, while offering additional protection at the
same time. The net effect is an expected injury level less than the injury
increase projected. The actual effect of the protection will be determined
`
	
	 after examination by the experts. One of the more obvious impacts of the
tunnel borer revolve around the improvement in protection for the excavator
operator, therefore largely mitigating the hazard of being struck while
operating the miner. At the same time, there is a projected increase in total
injuries due to the additional tunneling equipment. Whether these design
improvements will offset the additional injuries caused by the tunneling
equipment will depend on the final subsequent analysis by experts.
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Table 5-4. Initial Injury Projection for Roof, Face, and Rib Falls
Task	 Hist.	 Proj.
Time	 Labor	 Effect of	 Inj.	 Inj.
Hazard/Activity	 Ratio Ratio	 Protection (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Struck while
operating miner
Struck while per-
forming maintenance
Struck while per-
forming cleanup
Struck while test-
ing roof, barring
down, and roof bolt-
ing
Struck while opera-
ting haulage in
face area
Protective Large 3/42/14 Much less
measure than
3/42/14
0.35
	
1 Small 1/)6/8 0/13/4
0.6	 1 Medium ;/70/13 Less than
1/42/8
0.6	 1 Medium 14/309/129 Less than
8/185/77
Protective	 Large	 1/28/9	 Much less
measure	 than 1/28/9
4. Handling Material Injuries
The projections given in Table 5-7 show that the three major
sources of handling material injuries (machine maintenance, cleanup, and
supply) are seriously aggravated in the tunnel borer system. As indicates
earlier, these safety problems are caused by the greater amount of machinery,
shotcrete rebound problem, and the nature of the beast and flexicore activi-
ties. The one area where the tunnel borer demonstrates an improvement is the
elimination of the cable handling tasks associated with the continuous miner.
5. Explosion and Fire Injuries
The major hazards associated with explosions and fires basically
involve those activities performed near the :ace area. These are the opera-
tion and maintenance tasks related to the excavator and roof bolters. Table
5-8 shows that the protection offered by degasification, the shotcrete lining,
and reduced cutter head speed is "fairly complete" for operacing and roof
bolting; however, it is considered only marginal for maintenance due to the
fire hazard created by leaking hydraulic fluid.
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Table 5-5. Haulage Injury Projection
Task	 Hist.	 Proj.
Time	 Labor	 Effect of	 Inj.	 Inj.
Hazard/Activity	 Ratio Ratio	 Protection	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Operator or helper
caught or struck by
loader
Operator or workers
pinched or struck by
shuttle car
.r
Pinched while rerail-
ing cars, or operator
pinched in derailment
Pinched or struck
getting on or off
equipment, or riding
equipment
0
	
0	 N/A
	 3/94/26	 0/0/0
0
	
0	 N/A
	 1/174/3
	
0/0/0
1
	
1	 N/A
	 1/108/42	 1/108/42
1
	
1	 N/A
	
2/222/66
	 2/222/66
6. Electrical Injuries
By far the worst hazard encounterez in the electrical area is the
handling of electrical components and power cables during maintenance or
cleanup activities. Table 5-9 shows that while the elimination of the cable
handling tasks reduce exposure in this area, an increase in exposure occurs
due to the greater maintenance and cleanup required by the tunnel borer
system. A decrease in injuries was projected for the hazard caused by moving
equipment contacting energised cables, since the power cables are removed from
the working areas and placed in relatively undisturbed locations.
7. Slip and Fall Injuries
Table 5-10 displays a projected increase in slip and fall injuries
in three of the five major hazard categories and, no change for the remaining
categories. The increase projected for maintenance was based on a greater
exposure time. Here, improved lighting was considered ineffectual because it
was felt that workers would be exposed to more injuries falling from elevated
locations while doing maintenance on the tunnel borer, hoists, and
dmgasification drill. The size and weight of the beams and flexicore,
together with increased exposure during cleanup, offset the advantage of
better lighting in these hazard areas. The hazards areas associated with rail
car operation and supervision exposed workers to the same degree as in the
continuous miner system, resulting in no projected improvement.
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Table 5-6. Initial Injury Projection for Machinery Hazards
Task Hist. Proj.
Time	 Labor Effect of Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio	 Ratio Protection (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Operator or helper Protective Large 0/94/34 Much less
struck while opera- measure than
ting miner 0/94/34
Struck while doing 4	 1 Medium 0/38/20 Less than
Cleanup 0/152/80
Struck while moving 2.5	 1 Medium 1/516/175 Less than
or operating roof 3/1290/438
bolters
Struck or caught
	
1 1	 N/A 0/3/3a 0/8/3
while mov ag or
operating large drills
(Tunneling experience)
Caught while opera-	 1 1	 N/A 0/5/14a 0/5/14
ting or unclogging
shotcrete machinery
(Tunneling experience)
Caught while main-	 1 1	 N/A 0/3/la 0/3/1
taining shotcrete
machinery
(Tunneling experience)
Struck or caught
	
1 1	 N/A 0/2/la 0/2/1
while operating
hoists
(Tunneling experience)
alnjuries per million manhours.
8.	 Hand-tool Injuries
Table 5-11 essentially reflects the effects of more manhours and a
larger workforce on hand-tool injuries. In the case of maintenance, workers
are responsible for more machinery and therefore use hand tools more frequent-
-	 ly. As the historical injury data segregate hand-tool injuries by maintenance,
cleanup, setting temporary support, and repairing track, the hazard referenced
as "hand tools slipping or breaking while being used" addresses other support
activities in the continuous miner system. These activities include building
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Table 5-7. Initial Injury Projection for Handling Material Hazards
	
Task	 Hist.	 Proj.
	
Time	 Labor	 Effect of	 Inj.	 Inj.
Hazard/Activity	 Ratio Ratio	 Protection	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Worker drops com-	 1.2	 1	 N/A	 0/256/141	 0/307/169
ponent while doing
maintenance
Struck while handling 4 	 1	 N/A	 0/111/42	 0/444/168
material during
cleanup
Pinched or struck	 2	 2.6	 Small	 0/1244/365	 0/6469/1898
while handling
supplies
Injured handling 	 0	 0	 N/A	 0/168/50	 0/0/0
power cables
Table 5-8. Initial Injury Projection for Explosion and Fire Hazards
	
Task	 Hist.	 Proj.
	
Time	 Labor	 Effect of	 Inj.	 Inj.
Hazard/Activity	 Ratio	 Ratio	 Protection	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Struck by debris
	
1	 1	 Medium	 1/2/1	 Less than
or burnt while
	
1/2/1
operating miner
Burnt while doing
	
1.1	 1	 Small	 1/1/0	 1/1/0
maintenance
Struck by debris
	
2.5
	
1	 ;tedium	 1/l/l	 Less than
or burnt while	 3/3/3
operating roof
bolters
stoppings, clearing debris off tracks, etc. The single entry resign and shot-
crete liner employed by the tunnel borer reduce the need for these tasks con-
;	 siderably. However, the beam and flexicore installation tasks are important
$	 contributors to hand-tool injuries because of the large workforce involved.
Any tools (such as grappling hooks, slings, etc.) used in handling materials
F
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Table 5-9. Initial Injury Projection for Electrical Hazards
	
Task	 Hist.	 Proj.
	
Time	 Labor	 Effect of	 Inj.	 Inj.	 a
Hazard/Activity	 Ratio Ratio	 Protection	 ( F/DI/NDI)	 (F/OI/NDI)
Workers contact	 1.1	 1	 N/A	 2/67/25	 2/74/28
r;
	 energized con-
ductor while per-
forming maintenance
Workers contact	 3.4	 1	 small	 0/2/0	 0/7/0
frayed cable while
doing cleanup
Workers contact	 0	 0	 N/A	 1/10/4	 0/0/0
frayed cable while
cable reeling
Workers are tramming	 0.8	 Medium	 1/10/4	 Less than
or moving equipment	 1/8/3
and contact energized
cable
would also tend to be used more in the beam, track, pipe, and flexicore instal-
lation activities. Consequently, an increase in exposure was projected for
this hazard'as well.
9.	 Initial Injury Projection for Pressure Release Hazards
Injuries caused by pressure release hazards are the last group of
projections for the tunnel borer system. Table 5-12 indicates that the
majority of pressure release injuries occur during machine operation and main-
tenance. The projection shows an increase in maintenance-related injuries due
to the greater exposure time, and no change in injuries associated with the
operation of pneumatic equipment.
The last stage of the analysis involves a review of the initial injury
projections by a group of safety experts. The results of this review are
given in the next section.
D.	 INJURY ADJUSTMENT BY THE GROUP OF EXPERTS
The examination of the initial injury projections by a group of experts
is designed to quantify the assigned ratings for protective measures, and to
compensate for simplifying assumptions made in the analysis. For example, the
analysis does not consider the possibility of hazards interacting with each
other, and assumes that design changes which offer complete protection will
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Table 5-10. Initial Injury Projection for Slip and Fall Hazards
Task Hist. Proj.
Time Labor Effect of Inj. Inj.
Lazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Protection (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Slip and fall off 1.2 1 Small 0/60/20 0/72/24
machinery while
doing maintenance
Slip and fall doing 4 1 Small 0/30/8 0/120/32
cleanup
Slip and fall while 2 2.6 Small 0/116/22 0/603/114
handling awkward
materials
Slip and fall off	 i	 1	 N/A	 0/118/49	 0/118/49
rail cars, rerailing
cars, or coupling
cars
Slip and fall while
	
1	 1	 N/A
	
0/278/89	 0/278/89
supervising or
escaping a hazard
mitigate all hazards. In some cases, these assumptions may not be well
founded. It is for this reason that a group of experts with substantial
experience in equipment design and safety are used to review the initial
projections.
Four experts were chosen from the Bureau of dines, Spokane, Washington;
the Mine Safety and Health administration (MSHA), Denver, Colorado; and the
United Mine Workers (UMW), Washington, D.C. (15, 16, 17). The Bureau of Mines
expert was the Technical Project Manager for Tunneling Research at the time
the tunnel borer research was initiated. The two experts from MSHA were
selected from the Ground Support Division, and the Industrial Safety and
Electrical Division. The UMW representative was selected from the Office of
Safety. All of the above participants had considerable underground ruining
experience.
The experts were familiarized with the safety issues involved in this
assessment by the use of a briefing which covered the following topics:
(1) Graphic displays of the tunnel borer system.
(2) Complete descriptions of system components and operation for both
the borer and continuous miner.
t
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Table 5-11. Initial Injury Projection for Hand-tool Hazards
	Task	 Hist.	 Proj.
	
Time	 Labor	 Effect of	 Inj.	 In'.
Hazard/Activity
	
Ratio Ratio
	 Protection (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Tool slips or breaks
	
1.2	 1	 N/A
	
0/55/50	 0/66/60
during maintenance
Handtools slip or 	 2.3	 J	 N/A
	
0/277/331	 0/1911/2284
break while beiag
used (not for maint-
enance, track re-
pair, cleanup, or
temporary support)
Tool slips while
	
2	 2.6	 N/A
	
0/13/8
	
0/68/42
handling supplies
(3) An examination of the major system failures and hazards for both
the borer and continuous miner.
(4) An overview of the tunnel borer advantages and disadvantages,
compared with the continuous miner.
(5) A summary, by accident class and hazard, of both the historical
and projected injuries, showing the reasons for the projection as
a function of exposure time, personnel changes, and protective
measures.
The experts were provided both the historical and projected injury
levels so as to have a baseline from which they could make their own
projections. In the case of protective measures, they were asked to assign
numerical values to the projected effect of the protective device on reducing
injuries (e.g., a "much less than" rating could equate to a 90 to 100%
reduction in injuries, and a "less than" rating could equate to a 50 to 70%
reduction). The review process commenced with simply asking each expert
whether he believed the actual injury level would be closer to the historical
or projected level based on his experience and the indicated change in
exposure time, workforce and protection. The range between the two injury
levels was then cut in half and the experts were then asked to make another
refinement of their estimate. This process continued until each expert
reached a point where he could not refine his answer further. In most cases
the final answer was provided as a range. Additionally, the reasons for each
answer were also recorded. As a rule, though the experts varied in their
perceptions of the injury magnitudes, the direction of the responses (i.e.,
either up or down) and the reasons given were consistent among the group. The
final injury projection for each hazard was displayed as a range, encompassing
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Table 5-12. Initial Injury Projection for Pressure Release Hazards
Task	 Hist.	 Proj.
Time	 Labor	 Effect of	 Inj.	 Inj.
Hazard /Activity	 Ratio Ratio	 Protection	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Struck by whipping
	
1.3	 1	 N/A	 0/2/1	 0/3/1
hydraulic line
during maintenance.
Struck by pneumatic	 1	 1	 N/A	 0/6/0a	 0/6/0
lines or fittings
while operating
equipment.
(Tunneling experience)
alnjuries per million manhours.
all of the experts answers. Each participant was interviewed separately and
not apprised of the results of the other interviews. This approach insured
that each participant was not biased by the other expert's responses. The
following tables summarize the results of the interviews in the nine major
hazard areas. Detailed results are given in Appendix B. The tunnel borer was
compared against contemporary mining systems using the continuous miner as the
baseline. The approximate yearly manhours worked by the continuous miner
system are 200 million (18). Since the projected yearly injuries have already
factored in adjustments for manhour increases and differences in manning
levels via the analytical technique and inputs from the experts, both the
historical and projected injury levels can be divided by the baseline manhours
to establish comparable injury rates. This provides the injury rates in
"injuries per million manhours", and allows a comparison of the tunnel borer
safety performance with existing continuous miner injury rates and with the
safety requirement. Since injury frequency correlates more strongly with
exposure time than productivity, no attempt was made to balance differences in
coal production to establish the comparative social cost of the tunnel borer
as measured in injuries per ton.
1.	 Roof; Face, and Rib Fall Injuries
Table 5-13 shows that the experts generally agreed with the
projections for injuries due to rock falls, with the exception of the
maintenance hazard. In the case of maintenance at the face, the experts
indicated that the exposure would be actually greater than initially
anticipated because: (1) under bad roof conditions the support jacks could
F	 sustain more damage and thus increase maintenance time at the face, (2)
workers are still in the face area long enough for stress buildup in the
strata to cause falls, and (3) although the overall maintenance on continuous
miner equipment at the face is greater than the tunnel borer, these components
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Table 5-13. Final Projections for Roof, Face, and Rib Fall Injuries
Initial Injury Projection 	 Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 (F/DI/NDI)
	
(F/DI/NDI)
Struck while operating Much less than 0/0-4/0-1
miner 3/42/14
Struck while performing 0/13/4 0-1/13-36/4-8
maintenance
Struck while performing Less than 0/10-20/3-5
cleanup 1/42/8
Struck while testing or Less than 0/46-93/19-39
barring down roof, and 8/185/77
roof bolting
Struck while operating Much less than 0/3-6/1-2
haulage in the face area 1/28/9
are not always repaired in the face area thus reducing actual exposure closer
to that of the tunnel borer. The net result of these comments was an
adjustment of the projection upward toward of the historical level. The
experts felt that protection provided by the circular entry design, permanent
protection closer to the face, and the protection of the tunneling machine
itself provided a substantial reduction in the fall hazard associated with
cleanup. The fall hazard related to the conventional roof testing, temporary
support, and bolting task also received a large downward adjustment. The
reasons for this are twofold. First, the experience of the experts indicated
that the greatest portion of serious injuries occur while testing, barring
down roof, and placing temporary support. Historical injury data confirmed
this observation (19). Second, the protection offered by the circular entry
design, placement of permanent support closer to the face, and the roof bolter
canopy greatly reduces exposure. The largest factor given for mitigating
injuries caused by rock falls while operating haulage was the elimination of
shuttle cars from the system. The total yearly projected injuries for all
hazards in this accident class came to 0 to 4 fatalities, 119 to 208 disabling
injuries, and 39 to 69 nondisabling injuries. The injuries per million man-
hours then became respectively 0 to 0.02 fatalities, 0.6 to 1 disabling
injuries, and 0.8 to 1.2 overall injuries.
2.	 Haulage Injuries
Major hazard reductions associated with removing the loader and
shuttle cars from the system were confirmed by the experts. Table 5-14 also
shows that the experts agree that exposure to derailments, and being caught or
pinched while riding or getting on and off equipment would remain basically
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w	 Table 5-14. Final Projections for Haulage Injuries
Initial Injury Projection	 Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Operator or helper caught
or struck by loader
n
r	 Operator or workers pinched
or struck by shuttle car
Pinched while re pailing cars,
or during derailment
Pinched or struck getting
on or off equipment, or
riding equipment
Workers struck while
spotting or coupling cars,
and laying or repairing track
Struck while handling mater-
ials and working with
handtools in area of moving
haulage
0/0/0
	 0/0/0
0/0/0
	 0/0/0
1/108/42	 1/86-108/33-42
2/222/66	 2/222/66
0/101/24	 0/101/24
0/179/31	 0/125-179/22-31
unchanged. Expert comments on these hazards pointed out that: (1) bumps in
the track due to floor heave, and the ramp at the California switch, provide
causes for derailments on about the same scale as any other rail haulage
system; (2) workers can still operate the rail cars faster than they should,
resulting in derailments; and (3) workers often do not wait for equipment to
stop before getting on or off. The last two above sources of injuries are
human errors which appear to be inherent in any rail system.
Two other hazards, which historically have not resulted in as many
injuries as the above hazards, received considerable attention from the
experts. These sources of injuries were: (1) workers being struck or pinched
while coupling cars, and (2) workers being struck while handling materials in
the area of moving haulage. The projected increase in injuries for these
hazards stemmed from a large number of workers being involved in the flexicore
installation activity, increased rail car activity, and cleanup around the
loading hopper. Though the experts basically agreed with the projections,
they felt that improved visibility of operations due to the equipment layout
slightly mitigated the handling material hazard. Injury projections for these
additional hazards are also displayed in Table 5-14. The total yearly
projected injuries for this accident class was 5 fatalities, 625 to 745
disabling injuries, and 163 to 192 nondisabling injuries. This resulted
respectively in 0.03 fatalities per million manhours, 3.1 to 3.7 disabling
injuries per million manhours, and 3.9 to 4.7 overall injuries per million man-
hours.
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3. Machinery Injuries
Table 5-15 indicates that the experts generally concurred with the
initial projections. All the experts agreed that remote operation would
reduce exposure to being struck while operating the miner. It is interesting
to note that although the experts felt the increased cleanup time around
machinery increased the chance of injury, the equipment layout was considered
an important factor in helping to mitigate this hazard. The most important
adjustment made to machinery hazards resulted in a reduced injury projection
for the roof bolter. The reasons for this downward adjustment centered
around: (1) the reduced size and mass of the bolters, (2) the constrained
movement of the bolters, and (3) the simpler bolting procedure (i.e., less
moving and positioning). However, the experts observed no design improvements
to offset the hazards associated with the standard tunneling machinery.
The total projected injuries per million manhours for the machinery accident
class are 0.01 fatalities, 22 to 23 disabling injuries, and 24 to 27 overall
injuries per million manhours.
4. Handling Material Injuries
The impact of the key handling material hazards remained basically
unchanged after review by the experts. Table 5-16 shows that the experts did
not feel any adjustment was necessary for the hazards of dropping machine
components and dropping material while doing cleanup. Their joint experience
suggested that more time spent handling materials increases the chance of
being struck or pinched by materials. This same reasoning applied to the
projected increase in injuries resulting from handling supplies. The experts
felt that although t;:e hoists would help mitigate this hazard somewhat by not
requiring workers to carry supplies, substantial handling would still be
required while attaching components to the hoists and positioning them.
Consequently, the adjusted injuries were slightly lower than the original
projection, but considerably higher than the historical level. The original
projection for the cable handling hazard indicated total elimination of
injuries because the effort was reduced to a minima?. hanging cable task. The
experts noted that pinch points still exist when attaching the cable to the
rib. Thus, injuries to the hands or arms would still be possible. The total
projected handling material injuries are 0 fatalities, 4086 to 7427 disabling,
and 1344 to 2355 nondisabling. This equates to injury rates of 0 fatalities,
20 to 37 disabling injuries per million manhours, and 27 to 49 overall
injuries per million manhours.
5. Explosion and Fire Injuries
The chief explosion and fire hazards are caused by sparks
generated by the cutters, bolters, or tools and electrical components which in
turn ignite gas or cause a fire. Table 5-17 indicates that the experts
generally felt the ventilation, shotcrete lining and degasification would be
adequate to offset the hazard of machinery igniting gas. However, it was
noted that the gas monitor, being located twelve feet from the face, could
allow enough gas to build up to cause minor ignitions and slightly aggravate
the explosion hazard. The experts felt that the poor location of the gas
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Table 5-15. Final Projections for Machinery Injuries
Initial Injury Projection 	 Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
0/0-9/0-3Operator or helper
struck while operating
miner
Struck while doing
cleanup and using hand tools
Much less than
0/94/34
Less than
0/152/80
0/76-152/40-80
Struck while moving or 	 Less than	 0/516-645/219-438
operating roof bolters	 ,3/1290/438
Struck or caught while
	
0/18/19&
	
0/18/19a
operating large drills,
shotcrete machinery, or hoists
(Tunneling industry data)
&Injuries per million manhours
Table 5-16. Final Projections for Handling Material Injuries
Initial Injury Projection 	 Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Worker drops component	 0/307/169	 0/307/169
while doing maintenance
Ctruck while handling
	
0/444/168	 0/444/168
material during cleanup
Pinched or struck while
	
0/6469/1898	 0/3235-6469/949-1898
handling supplies
Injured handling power cables	 0/0/0	 0/0-34/0-10
monitor, coupled with use of flammable hydraulic fluid, also increased
exposure to fires during maintenance. The to . al injuries for all hazards in
the explosion and fire accident class are 3 to 5 fatalities, 3 to 6 disabling
injuries, and 3 to 5 nondisabling injuries. This results respectively in 0.02
to 0.03 fatalities per million manhours, 0.02 to 0.03 disabling injuries per
million manhours, and 0.05 to 0.08 overall injuries per million manhours.
i
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Table 5-17. Final Projections for Explosion and Fire Injuries
Initial Injury Projection	 Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
Struck by debris or burnt
	
Less than
while operating miner and 	 4/5/4	 0-2/0-3/0-2
roof bolters
burnt while doing maintenance	 1/1/0	 2/2/1
6. Electrical Injuries
Table 5-18 shows a modest downward adjustment of the maintenance
injury projection. Although the experts basically agreed that the slight
increase in electrical maintenance would increase exposure, it was felt that
the amount of cable maintenance and outby electrical maintenance (i.e., switch
boxes, etc.) for the continuous miner was somewhat underestimated. This would
tend to make the overall exposure between the two systems approximately
equal. Therefore, it was felt that the actual injury level would be within
the range of both the historical and projected levels. The experts adjusted
the cleanup related injuries back down to the historical level because it was
felt that the relative permanency of the cable locations would allow workers
to always know Phere the cables are located. Since the tunnel borer cable
handling activity is greatly reduced due to the equipment layout and removal
of the main power cable from the work areas, the experts concurred with the
original projection. Injuries related to moving and tramming equipment were
also adjusted downward for the equipment layout and cable removal reasons.
The total yearly injuries for all electrical hazards results in 4 fatalities,
116 to 128 disabling injuries, and 59 to 64 nondisabling injuries. This
equates to 0.02 fatalities per million manhours, 0.6 disabling injuries per
million manhours, and 1 overall injury per million manhours.
7. Slip and Fall Injuries
The adjustments shown in Table 5-19 generally reflect the experts'
assessment of the advantages of improved lighting, the reduction of obstacles
such as rib slough, and the reduction in equipment conjestion because of the
straight line layout. One hazard which historically has not contributed many
injuries is workers "slipping or falling while operating machinery other than
the mining machine or haulage". This received considerable attention from the
experts because of the high labor intensiveness of the shotcrete and hoist
activities. The experts felt that workers had a greater chance of falling
during the hoist activities due to the congestion (i.e., workers could slip
am knock others off balance). In addition, it was felt that workers could
slip and fall during the shotcrete task as a result of standing-water on the
floor. The improved lighting was believed to reduce these hazards only
marginally.
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Table 5-18. Final Projections for Electrical Injuries
Initial Injury Projection Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Workers contact energized 2/74/28 2/67-74/25-28
conductor while performing
G	 maintenance
Workers contact frayed cable 0/7/0 0/2/0
while doing cleanup
Workers contact frayed cable 0/0/0 0/0/0
while cable reeling
Workers are tramming or Less than
moving equipment and contact 1/8/3 0/0-3/0-1
energized cable
Table 5-19.	 Final Projections for Slip and Fall Injuries
Initial Injury Projection Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Slip and fall off machinery 0/72/24 0/61-72/20-24
while doing maintenance
Slip and fall doing cleanup 0/120/32 0/60-120/16-32
Slip and fall while handling 0/679/144 0/679/144
awkward materials and handtools
to install components
Slip and fall off rail cars, 0/118/49 0/94-118/39-49
rerailing cars, or coupling cars
Slip and fall :,tile supervising 0/278/89 0/209-278/67-89
or escaping a hazard
Slip ane fall while moving 0/334/121 0/284-334/103-121
or operating other machinery
F
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The total yearly projected slip and fall injuries are 0 fatalities, 1413 to
1531 disabling injuries, and 398 to 469 nondisabling injuries. This results
in 0 fatalities per million manhours, 7 to 8 disabling injuries per million
manhours, and 9 to 11 overall injuries per million manhours.
8. Hand-tool Injuries
As showa in ':able 5-20, the experts agreed on two of the three
major hazard projections for hand-tool injuries. The only deviation fror. the
initial projections concerned the general use of tools for activities similar
to outby support (i.e., rebuilding stoppings, moving and storing supplies,
installing cribbing, etc.). Although two of the experts agreed with the
projected increase because of the labor intensiveness of the bean, track, and
flexicore installation activities, the third expert adjusted the projection
slightly downwards. The continuous miner system typically employs several
outby support crews working in the crosscuts. ThAs would tend to bring the
comparative workforce and manhour ratios closer together. At the same time is
was agreed that the beam and flexicore tasks were performed on a more
continuous basis than normal continuous miner outby support activities.
Overall, these factors tended to place the actual injury level somewhere
between the historical experience and the initial projection.
The total yearly injuries for all hand-tool hazards are 0 fatalities, 825 to
213E disabling injuries, and 2470 nondisabling injuries. This equates to 0
fatalities per million manhours, 4 to 11 disabling injuries per million
manhours, and 16 to 23 overall injuries per million manhours.
9. Pressure Release Injuries
Table 5-21 shows that even with an initially projected increase in
exposure time, and resultant rise in maintenance related injuries, the experts
adjusted the projection upwards. This was because it was felt that the size
and complexity of the tunnel borer system provided more opportunities for
hydraulic and pneumatic failures. The experts agreed that pneumatic-related
injuries would be close to historical experience in tunneling operations. The
total yearly injury rates for all pressure release hazards are 0 fatalities
per million manhours, 6 disabling injuries.per million manhours, and 6 overall
injuries per million manhours.
The preceding tables, showing the final injury projections for the major
hazards, clearly indicate that the major weaknesses in the tunnel borer system
stem from the extra tunneling machinery used and from the installation of the
tunnel divider. Section VI provides a detailed comparison of the injury rates
of the tunnel borer and continuous miner system, revealing the strengths and
weaknesses of the tunnel borer system as presently designed.
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Table 5-20. Final Projections for Hand-tool Injuries
Initial Injury Projection 	 Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 (F/DI/NDI)
	
(F/DI/NDI)
Tool slips or breaks during	 0/66/60	 0/66/60
maintenance
Handtools slip or break while 	 0/1911/2284	 0/600-1911/2284
r	 being used, mostly outby support
Tool slips while handling supplies 0/68/42 	 0/68/42
Table 5-21. Final Projections for Pressure Release Injuries
Initial Injury Projection 	 Adjustment by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 (F/DI/NDI)
	
(F/DI/NDI)
Struck by whipping hydraulic
	 0/3/1	 0/3-6/1-2
line during maintenance
Struck by pneumatic lines or	 0/6/0a	 0/6/0a
fittings while operating
equipment (Tunneling experience)
alnjuries per million manhours
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SECTION VI
CONCLUSIONS
A. OVEitVIEW
This section assembles all of the injury projections given in section v
and provides a comparison of the tunnel borer safety performance against both
the continuous miner injury levels, and the safety requirement previously
developed for advanced mining systems (2). Strengths and weaknesses of the
tunnel borer system are analyzed in light of the preceding safety analysis,
and design changes are suggested for the hazard areas which present serious
safety problems.
B. COMPARISON OF INJURY RATES
1.	 Continuous Miner Injury Rate Comparison
The results of the quantitative evaluation suggest that the tunnel
borer system offers both advantages and disadvantages when compared with the
continuous miner system. The major differences between the two systems are
highlighted in Table 6-1, which compares continuous miner historical injuries
to the final projections for the tunnel borer, by major accident class.
The use of a circular entry, shotcrete, roof bolts, tunnel divider, and
remote operation were deciding factors in substantially mitigating roof fall
hazards. Table 6-1 indicates a reduction in fatalities by a factor of ten,
and disabling injuries by a factor of three in this area. The key elements
which contributed to a reduction in serious haulage injuries (a 502 reduction
in fatalities, and roughly a 15 to 202 reduction in disabling injuries), were
the elimination of shuttle cars and the placement of the conveyor away from
the working areas. The machinery injury rates shown in Table 6-1 are broken
down into injuries related to coal mining components and injuries related to
tunneling components. This was done to demonstrate the strong and weak points
of the tunnel borer. The preceding analysis indicates that serious injuries
could be decreased by: (1) reducing the unpredictability of machinery movement
and position, (2) :educing the mobility of machinery, and (3) integrating
machine functions to reduce place changing. These elements were incorporated
in the tunnel borer design through the layout of equipment, constraining both
the miner and roof bolters to only move in one direction, and by integrating
the roof bolters with the miner. Consequently, the serious injury projection
for the basic components of mining machine and bolters was lower than the his-
torical rates experienced by the continuous miner. However, Table 6-1 also
shows that this improvement was offset by the use of other pieces of tunneling
machinery. The disabling injury rate for machine hazards was further aggra-
vated by the large workforce employed for the shotcrete and tunnel divider
activities. This tended to expose more workers for a longer period of time to
hazards such as being struck while handling supplies, or being struck by other
moving machinery while doing cleanup and working with hand tools. The factor
which effected handling material injuries the most was the beam and flexicore
installation activities. The increased exposure of workers to hazards related
to installing the tunnel divider accounted for roughly 802 of the total dis-
abling injury projection. The experts agreed that even with the hoists,
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Table 6-1.	 Detailed
(CM) and
(yearly
Injury Rate
Tunnel Borer
injuries per
Comparison for the Continuous Miner
(TB) Systems, by Accident Class
million manhours)
Fatalities Disabling Injuries
Accident Class CM TB CM TB
Roof, face, rib falls 0.14 0-0.02 3 0.6-1
Haulage 0.06 0.03 4 3.1-3.7
Machinery
Miner and roof bolter 0.03 0.01 5 4-5
Hoists, degas drill, 0 0 0 18
and shotcrete
Handling material 0 0 11 20-37
Explosion/fire 0.03 0.02-0.03 0.03 0.02-0.03
Electrical 0.02 0.02 1 0.6
Slip/fall 0 0 4 7-8
Handtools 0 0 2 4-11
Pressure bursts 0 0 0 6
Total .3 0.08-0.1 30 63-90
workers still had considerable opportunities to be injured. In conjunction
with increased handling material injuries, the handtool projection envisions a
two to five fold increase in serious injuries as a result of the work required
to install the tunnel divider.
As shown previously, the explosion hazard was mitigated by the
degasification feature. However a projected increase in exposure to fire
during maintenance offset the reduced explosion potential, resulting in injury
rates similar to existing experience in continuous mining sections. The
potential for injury from electrical shock was somewhat mitigated by the
removal of the main power cable from the work areas, and the improved
equipment layout which essentially eliminated the cable handling task. The
equipment layout also reduced the chance of cable damage due to equipment
impact. This resulted in almost a 50% reduction in disabling injuries. The
last major accident class affected, pressure release, experienced a
substantial increase in injuries because of the greater use of high pressure
hydraulics and pneumatics on the tunnel borer equipment. The hoists and
shotcrete machinery were the major sources for this projected increase.
In total, the tunnel borer demonstrates a marked improvement over the
cont i nuous miner in fatalities for the nine dominant accident classes shown in
Table 6-1. However, the tunnel borer is roughly a factor of two to three
higher in disabling injuries. Furthermore, the serious weaknesses of the
tunnel borer revolve around the increased machinery used and the extensive
material handling associated with the tunnel divider construction. It is also
interesting to note that the fist eight accident classes shown in Table 6-1
compose the bulk of the total injuries (in excess of 76%) experienced in
underground mining. There are thirteen remaining accident classes which, when
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considering their injury rates, result in total yearly injury rates for
continuous mining of approximately 0.33 fatalities per million manhours, 40
disabling injuries per million manhours, and 55 overall injuries per million
manhours. In comparison, the tunnel borer system is still roughly two times
higher in both disabling and overall injury rates.
2.	 Safety Requirement Injury Rate Comparison
Comparison of the tunnel borer injury rate projections with the
safety requirement given in Table 6-2 shows that the tunnel borer system meets
the fatality rate, but far exceeds the disabling and overall injury rates.
Table 6-2. Comparison of Injury Rates for the Tunnel Borer System with the
Safety Requirements (yearly injuries per million manhours)
Projected Tunnel
Injury Categories	 Borer Injuries	 Safety Requirement
Fatalities
	 0.08-0.1	 0.2
Disabling Injuries	 63-40	 30
Overall Injuries	 100	 40-45
Thus the data indicate that the tunnel borer system, as presently
designed, would not be considered an advanced system. An additional criterion
to be met by an advanced system is a demonstration of improved safety in the
four accident classes which historically contribute the bulk fatalities and
disabling injuries. These classes are, in order of severity, rock falls,
haulage, machinery, and handling materials. Table 6-1 clearly shows that the
tunnel borer system affects a reduction in only the first two classes.
C.	 SUGGESTED AREAS FOR DESIGN IMPROVEMENT
It appears that some obvious design changes can be made by analyzing the
major safety problems associated with the tunnel borer. As shown in the
previous section, the integration of the excavator and roof bolter has a
favorable safety impact. However, the additional use of tunneling equipment
aggravated the hazards. The requirement to install the tunnel divider
originated from the MSHA ventilation regulation, which requires that both
intake and exhaust airways be provided. This would also provide two means of
escape for workers in the event of explosion or fire. In the process of
meeting this regulation, the tunnel borer system partially offset the
explosion and fire hazards by a design redundancy which employed degasifica-
tion, higher face ventilation, and flexicore installation. This design
appeared sound but, in examining the relative contribution to reducing serious
injuries, had relatively little impact on an already low injury rate.
f
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Furthermore, the flexicore installation resulted in a major increase in the
machinery and handling material injuries. This is not meant to imply that
emphasis should not be placed on the explosion hazard. .What this finding does
imply is that exact compliance with regulations, without analyzing the
possible side effects, can result in hazards being shifted from one area to
another. This finding further implies that the emphasis placed on using
state-of-the-art system components should have been replaced with a total
system analysis of new technology and methods for ventilation and gas
control. The use of alternative gas bleeding, collecting, or monitoring
systems could possibly be employed at the face in a redundant fashion so that
the intent of the ventilation regulations could still be met, with the
complete elimination of the tunnel divider activity. The next stage in the
analysis would be to investigate alternative ways of managing the ventilation
problems so as to not increase hazards in this area, and also investigate
alternatives to the unwieldy tunneling equipment, such as the hoists,
shotcrete machinery, and degasification drill.
t
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APPENDIX A
DETAILED INJURY PROJECTIONS BY
ACCIDENT CLASS AND HAZARD
"d
A-1
Accident Class: Roof, face, rib falls
M
Potential
Task Effect of Hist. Proj.
Time	 Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio	 Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Operator, helper struck Protective Large 3/42/14 Much less than
while operating miner. measure 3/42/14
Struck while performing 0.35	 1 Small 1/36/8 0/13/4
maintenance in face area.
Struck while performing 0.6	 1 Medium 2/70/13 Less than
cleanup in face area. 1/42/8
Struck while testing 0.6	 1 Medium 14/309/129 Less than
roof, barring down 8/185/77
rock and roof
bolting.
Struck while performing Protective Large 0/4/1 Much less than
environmental checks in measure 0/4/1
between place changes.
Struck while operating Protective Large 1/28/9 Much less than
haulage in face area. measure 1/28/9
Struck while handling or 0	 0 N/A 1/15/2 0/0/0
reeling cable.
Struck while setting 0	 0 N/A 1/18/3 0/0/0
brattice.
Struck while operating Protective Large 0/4/4 Much less than
or rerailing rail cars, measure 0/4/4
or repairing track.
Struck while escaping Protective Medium 2/7/2 Less than
hazard or during accident measure 2/7/2
recovery.
Struck while riding Protective Large 0/5/3 Much less than
equipment to working measure 0/5/3
area.
Struck while supervising 1	 1 N/A 2/44/11 2/44/11
PRECEDING PAGE 61.A,Nk NOT
A-3
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Accident Class: Haulage
W:
Potential
Task Effect of Hist. Proj.
Time Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Miner operator or helper 0 0 N/A 3/94/26 0/0/0
caught or struck by
loader.
Workers struck while Protective Large 0/14/2 Much less than
operating or articulating measure 0/14/2
conveyor.
Workers struck by loader 0.5 1 Small 1/8/2 1/4/1
or conveyor during cleanup.
Workers struck by loader, 0.8 1 Small 1/32/6 1/26/5
conveyor, or rail car
doing maintenance in area.
Workers pinched while	 1.7	 1	 N/A	 0/55/13	 0/94/22
spotting or coupling
rail cars.
Workers struck while	 0	 0	 N/A	 0/10/2	 0/0/0
reeling or handling
cable.
Workers struck while 1 1 N/A 00/2 0/7/2
laying or repairing
track.
Workers struck while 1.6 2 N/A 0/23/6 0/74/19
operating other equip-
ment in area of moving
haulage.
Workers pinched while 1 1 N/A 1/108/42 1/108/42
repailing equipment,
or operator pinched in
derailment.
Struck while handling 1.3 3 N/A 0/46/8 0/179/31
mrterials and working
with handtools (i.e.,
includes cleanup but
not maintenance).
S
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Accident Class: Haulage (Cont'd)
Potential
Task Effect of Hist. Proj.
Time Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Struck while setting 0 0 N/A 0/4/1 0/0/0
brattice.
Struck while drilling 1 1 Medium 0/3/0 Less than
face or.rib. 0/3/0
Operator or workers 0 0 N/A 1/174/3 0/0/0
pinched or struck by
shuttle car.
Pinched or struck get- 1 1 N/A 2/222/66 2/222/66
ting on or off, or
riding equipment.
Pinched or struck 1 1 N/A 0/24/3 0/24/3
while supervising.
Accident Class: Machinery
M
Potential
Task Effect of Hist. Proj.
Time Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Operator or helper Protective Large 0/94/34 Much less than
struck or pinched while measure 0/94/34
operating miner.
Workers struck by 0.9 1 N/A 1/49/21 1/44/19
machinery while doing
maintenance.
Workers struck while 0 0 N/A 1/26/4 0/0/0
reeling or handling
cable.
Workers struck while 4 1 Medium 0/38/20 Less than
doing cleanup and using 0/152/80
handtools	 (i.e., not
maintenance).
Workers struck while 2 1.7 N/A 0/23/6 0/78/20
handling supplies.
Struck while installing 0 0 N/A 1/23/18 0/0/0
temporary support.
Workers caught or struck 2.5 1 Medium 1/516/175 Less than
while moving or operating 3/1290/438
roof bolter.
Workers struck b	 other erotective Large 1/10/2 Much less than
machinery in area of measure 1/10/2
conveyor.
Workers struck while 1 1 N/A 0/16/3 0/16/3
riding or getting off
machinery.
Struck while setting 0 0 N/A 0/14/1 0/0/0
brattice.
Struck while supervising. 1 1 N/A 0/27/5 0/27/5
A-6
Struck or caught while
	
1	 1 N/A 0/8/3 0/8/3
moving or operating
large drills.
Caught while operating	 1	 1 N/A 0/5/14 0/5/14
or unclogging shotcrete
machinery.
Caught while maintaining
	
1	 •1 N/A 0/3/1 ^/3/1
shotcrete machinery.
Struck or caught while 	 1	 1 N/A 0/2/1 0/2/1
operating hoists.
I
ti
Accident Class: Machinery (Cont'd)
Potential
Task Effect of Rise. Proj.
Time	 Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity
	
Ratio	 Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Struck by other machinery	 1	 1 N/A 0/4/1 0/4/1
while operating rail
cars.
Struck by other machinery 0 	 0	 N/A
	
1/56/17	 0/0/0
while operating shuttle
cars.
Tunneling industry data
(given in injuries per
million manhours). i	 i
A-7
Accident Class: Handling Materials
Potential
Task Effect of Hist. Proj.
Time Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Operator or helper struck 0 0 N/A 0/37/23 0/0/0
or pinched moving objects
out of way of miner.
Workers drop machine or 1.2 1 N/A 0/256/141 0/307/169
electrical components
while doing maintenance.
'	 Workers struck while hand- 	 4 1 N/A 0/111/42 0/444/168
ling material and hand-
tools during cleanup.
Workers are struck while 2 2.6 Small 0/1244/365 0/6469/1898
handling supplies and
handtools to install
components.
Workers struck handling 0.1 1 N/A 0/20/14 0/2/1
coal and rock while bar-
ring down loose rock.
Workers injured handling 0 0 N/A 0/168/50 0/0/0
power cables.
Workers pinched or struck 1 1 Medium 0/54/31 Less than
moving debris off tracks 0/54/31
or handling muck after
repailing cars.
Worker pinched handling 1 1 N/A 0/19/13 0/19/13
pins while coupling rail
cars.
Workers struck while 1 1 Small 0/55/19 0/55/19
laying or repairing
track.
Workers struck while 0 0 N/A 0/36/19 0/0/0
installing brattice.
a
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Accident Classt Handling Materials (Cont'd)
'I
Potential
Task affect of Hist. Proj.
Time Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Measure (P/DI/VDI) (P/DI/NDI)
Workers drop aaterials 1 1 N/A 0/24/16 0/24/16
while walking or
running.
Workers drop drill 1 1 N/A 0/10/15 0/10/15
section while drilling
face or rib.
Workers pinched while 0 0 N/A 0/62/46 0/0/0
wowing debris away from
shuttle car.
Struck while supervising 1 1 Small 0/43/44 0/43/44
or during accident
recovery.
I A-9
's Accident Class:	 Explosion/Fire
Potential
Task Effect of Hist. Proj.
Time Labo- Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Struck by debris or 1 1 Medium 1/2/1 Less than
burnt while operating 1/211
miner.
Burnt while doing 1.1 1 Small 1/1/0 1/1/0
maintenance.
Struck by debris white 2.5 1 Medium 1/1/1 Less than
operating roof bolters. 3/3/3
Workers burnt while 1 1 N/A 0/1/1 0/1/1
doing weld repairs.
Workers operate rail cars 1 1 N/A 1/0/1 1/0/1
or conveyor and sparking
causes fire.
Workers struck while 1 .4 N/A 1/1/0 0/0/0
handling materials in
face area.
A-10
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' ident Class:	 Electrical
Potential
Task Effect of Riot. Proj.
Time Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Operator or helper come 1 0.5 N/A 0/3/1 0/2/1
in contact with energized
conductor while operating
miner.
Workers contact energized 1.1 1 N/A 2/67/25 2/74/28
conductor while perform-
ing machine or electrical
maintenance.
Workers are tramming or 0.8 1 Medium 1/10/4 Less than
moving equipment and 1/8/3
contact energized cable.
Workers contact trolley 0 0 N/A 0/10/14 0/0/0
wire getting on and off
equipment.
Workers contact energized 3.4 1 Small 0/2/0 0/7/0
cable while performing
cleanup.
Workers are handling 0.9 1.7 Small 1/10/2 2/15/3
metal supplies and con-
tact energized conductor.
Workers contact energized 0 0 N/A 1/10/4 0/0/0
cable while handling or
reeling cable.
Workers are using conduc- 1.9 3 Small 0/2/4 0/11/23
ting handtools and
contact energized conductor
(not maintenance).
Workers contact energized 1 1 N/A 0/16/7 0/16/7
conductor while operating
or rerailing rail cars.
Workers perform weld 1 1 N/A 0/4/1 0/4/1
repairs and are burnt
or shocked by arc.
A-11
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Accident Class: Slip and Fall
Potential
Task Effect of Hist. Proj.
Time Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activ=.ty Ratio Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Workers slip and fall 1 1 N/A 0/12/5 0/12/5
while drilling face or
rib, or moving drill.
Slip while barring 0.1 1 N/A 0/8/3 0/1/0
down loose rock.
Slip and fall while Protective Large 0/11/5 Much less than
operating miner. measure 0/11/5
Slip and fall while 4.2 1.7 N/A 0/47/17 0/334/121
moving or operating
other machinery.
Slip and fall while 4 1 Small 0/30/8 0/120/32
doing cleanup.
Slip and fall off 1.2 1 Small 0/60/20 0/72/24
machinery while doing
maintenance.
Slip and fall handling 2 2.6 Small 0/116/22 0/603/114
awkward supplies.
Slip and fall while 0 0 N/A 0/35/8 0/0/0
cable reeling.
Slip and fall while 1.6 1.7 Small 0/28/11 0/76/30
working with handtools
(not maintenance).
Slip and fall laying 1 1 Small 0/12/1 0/12/1
and repairing track.
Slip and fall while Protective Large 0/22/6 Much less than
operating or articulating measure 0/22/6
conveyor.
A-12
tAccident Class: Slip and Fall (Cont'd)
Potential
i
Task Effect of Riot. Proj.
Time	 Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity	 Ratio	 Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Slip and fall operating 	 1	 1 N/A 0/118/49 0/118/49
locomotive, rerailing
equipment, getting on
or off equipment, riding
equipment, coupling rail
cars, spotting cars.
Slip and fall setting 	 0.1	 1	 N/A	 0/16/4	 0/2/0
or removing props.
Slip and fall while	 0	 0	 N/A	 0/14/4	 0/0/0
setting brattice.
Slip and fall escaping 	 1	 1	 Small	 0/278/89	 0/278/89
a hazard or while
supervising.
A-13
Accident Class: Handtools
Potential
Task	 Effect of	 Hist.	 Proj.
Time	 Labor	 Protective	 Inj.	 Inj.	 i
Hazard/Activity	 Ratio Ratio	 Measure	 (F/DI/NDI)	 (F/DI/NDI)
i
Struck while widening 0 0 N/A 0/1/1 0/0/0
the entry.
Struck while barring 0.1 1 N/A 0/12/6 0/l/l
down face and rib.
Struck by tool while 4 1 N/A 0/5/4
I
0/20/16
performing cleanup.
Tool slips or breaks 1.2 1 N/A 0/55/50 0/66/60
while performing
maintenance.
Handtools slip or break 2.3 3 N/A 0/277/331 0/1911/2284
while being used (not
maintenance, cleanup,
or setting temporary
support); mostly outby
support.
Struck while laying or 1 1 N/A 0/8/5 0/8/5
repairing track.
Tool slips while handling 2 2.6 N/A 0/13/8 0/68/42
supplies.
Struck while coupling 1 1 N/A 0/17/8 0/17/8
cars or rerailing cars.
Struck while tightening 5.8 1 N/A 0/6/8 0/35/46
drills.
Tool slips or breaks 0.1 1 N/A 0/32/17 i/3/2
while setting props or
timber.
Struck while setting 0 0 N/A 0/4/4 0/0/0	 l
brattice.
Tool slips while adjust- 1 1 N/A 0/0/1 0/0/1
ing conveyor, spill
pans, etc.
Supervisor struck by 1 1 N/A 0/4/4 0/4/4
tool.
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ti	 Accident Class: Pressure Release
i
Potential i
Task Effect of Hist. Proj.
Time Labor Protective Inj. Inj.
Hazard/Activity Ratio Ratio Measure (F/DI/NDI) (F/DI/NDI)
Struck by whipping 1.3 1 N/A 0/2/1 0/3/1
hydraulic line while
doing maintenance.
Struck by pressure 1 1 N/A 0/0/1 0/0/1
release from failed
hydraulic jack.
Tunneling industry
experience (given in
injuries per million
manhours).
Struck by pneumatic 	 1	 1	 N/A	 * 0/6/0	 0/6/0
lines, or fittings
while operating
equipment.
*Injuries per million manhours.
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APPENDIX B
DETAILED INJURY ADJUSTMENTS BY
GROUP OF EXPERTS, BY ACCIDENT
CLASS AND HAZARD
B-1
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PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
Accident Class: Roof. face. Rib Palls
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection	 by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 P/DI/NDI	 P/DI/NDI Reason
Operator, helper struck	 Much less	 0/0-4/0-1 B of M - Agree that remote oper-
while operating miner.	 than ation and protection is adequate;
3/42/14 operator could leave protection
to check a possible equipment
failure and be exposed at that
time.
MSHA - No comment; soft of these
injuries are incurred doing
retreat mining with continuous
miners.	 The t:innel borer would
not be comparable for this
activity.
OMW - Agree with protective
aspects.
Struck while performing 	 0/13/4	 0-1/13-36/4-8 B of M - Projection is too low;
maintenance in face area. the repair activity around the
support jacks could take more time
(particularly under bad roof) and
increase exposure.
MSHA - Exposure is the same
because workers are in face area
long enough for stresses to build
up and cause a fall.
UM - Exposure is the same because
the continuous miner is actually
repaired in the face area for
about the same amount of time.
Struck while performing
	
Less than	 0/10-20/3-5 B of M - Slight chance of injury
cleanup in face area.	 1/42/8 cleaning up around conveyor; arms
and hands are exposed cleaning up
under tunnel borer.
MSMA - Some exposure due to rock
falling around tunnel borer.
1Mi - Hands and area exposed to
rock falling around tunnel borer.
B-3
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Accident Class: Roof, Face. Rib Falls (Continuation 1)
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection by Experts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI F/DI/NDI Reason
Struck while testing Less than 0/46-93/19-39 B of M - Concur with protective
roof, barring down loose 8/185 /77 Manures; removing temporary sup-
rock, and roof bolting. port task is a key factor in
further reducing injuries.
MSHA - Only factors are the
exposure during bolting and the
barring down activity.
UMW - Concur with protective
measures - removal of temporary
support task is the biggest
reduction factor.
Struck while performing Much less 0/0-1/0-1 B of M - Some exposure could
environmental checks. than exist while doing maintenance on
0/4/1 the gas monitor.
MSHA /UMW - Agree with protective
aspects.
Struck while operating Much 1033 0/3-6/1-2 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Soma exposure
haulage in face area. than could exist when checking out the
1/28/9 conveyor; removal of the shuttle
car is a big reduction factor.
Struck while cable 0/0/0 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
reeling. projection.
Struck while setting 0/0/0 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
brattiee. projection.
Struck while operating Much less 0/0-1/0-1 B of M - Some exposure could
or repailing rail cars, than 0/4/4 exir.+ if the shoterete is not
or repairing track. applied properly, resulting in rib
slough.
MSHA/UMW - Concur with protective
manures.
B-4
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Accident Class: Roof, Face, Rib Falls (Continuation 2)
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection	 by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 F/DI/NDI	 F/DI/NDI	 Reason
Struck while riding 	 Much Jess	 0/0/0
equipment to face area. 	 thaii
0/5/3
Struck while supervising.	 2/44/11	 2/44/11
B of N - Most workers are
protected; some exposure
exists if accident occurs during
maintenance at the face.
MMA/UMW •• Some exposure exists
during the eutterhead maintenance
activity.
B of N/MSNA/UMM - Concur with
protective masures.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
projection; supervisors are always
the first people to take risks
while investigating problems.
Struck while escaping
	
Less than	 1/3/1
a hazard or during 	 2/7/2
accident recovery.
B-5
Accident Class: Hsulaae
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection by Experts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI F/DI/NDI Reason
Operator or helper 0/0/O 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with
struck or caught by projection.
loader.
Workers struck while Much less 0/7/1 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Location of
operating or articulating than conveyer out of the working areas
conveyor. 0/14/2 is major reduction factor.
Struck by loader or con- 1/4/1 1/4/1 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
veyor doing cleanup projection.
in the area.
Workers struck by loader 1/26/5 1/26/5 B of M/MLSHA/UMW - Concur with
or conveyor doing main- projection.
tenance in area.
Workers struck while 0/101/24 0/101/24 B of M - Agree with projection;
spotting or coupling rail the hazards are aggravated when
oars, and laying or both supply cars and suck cars
repairing track. are running simultaneously on both
tracks.
MSHA/UMW - Agree with projection;
when operating both trains workers
must keep track of several
activities and are working in
tight Quarters.
Workers struck while 011012 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
handling or reeling projection.
cable.
Workers struck while 0/74/19 0/30-74/8-19 B of M - Exposure time is
operating other equip- greater, but rail cars and supply
sent in area of haulage. cars are not always running during
hoist operations; projection is
high.
MSHA/LMW - Concur with projection.
r
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Accident Class: Haulage (Continuation 1)
Initial Injury	 Adjustment
Projection	 by gzperts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI	 F/DI/NDI Reason
Workers pinched during 1/108/42	 1/86-108/33+2 B of M - Agree with projection;
derailment or while this hazard is aggravated by the
re0ailing cars. ra	 used in the California switchmp
and small heaves in the floor.
MSHA/UMW - Basically agree with
projection; Resides pwrturbations
in the floor, workers often
operate cars faster than they
should.
Struck while handling 0/17y/31	 0/125-179/22-31 B of M/MSHA - Agree with
materials and working projection.
with handtools in area UMW - Projection may be slightly
of moving haulage. high; work areas generally give
better visibility of operations
and blind corners are reso:ed by
not having crosscuts in the entry.
Struck while setting 0/0/0	 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
brattice. jection; task removed.
Struck while drilling Less than	 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Drilling
face or rib. 0/3/0 activities are basically away from
the haulage areas so projection is
accurate.
Workers struck by 0/0/0	 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Removing the
Shuttle oar. shuttle car is a major
improvement
Pinched or struck getting 2/222/66	 2/222/66 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
on or off, or riding jection; system offers no
equipment. protection for this hazard and
workers often do not wait for
equipment to stop before getting
Off.
Pinched or struck while 0/24/3	 0/24/3 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Supervisors
supervising. are often absorbed in other tasks
and do not see moving equipment.
B-7
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Accident Class: Mschinery
Hazard/Activity
Initial Injury	 Adjustment
Projection	 by experts
F/DI/NDI	 F/DI/NDI Anson
Operator or helper struck Much less	 0/0-9/0-3 B of M - Basically agree with
or pinched while operating than projection; there may be a slight
nicer. 0/94/34 risk if workers are testing the
support jacks after a repair.
MSHA/UMW - Concur with protective
aspects.
Workers struck by 1/44/19	 1/25-44/10-19 B of M/UMW - Straight line
machinery while layout of system generally gives
doing maintenance. workers better visibility of other
operations taking place and would
help reduce injures.
MSHA - Agree with projection.
Workers struck while Less than
	 0/76-152/40-80 B of M/MSHA - Basically agree
doing cleanup and wing 0/152/80 with projection; increased
handtools (i.e.. not exposure time is a definite
mintenance). factor while working near
machinery.
UMW - Straight line arrangement of
machinery gives workers better
visibility and reduoes some of the
interface with the hazard.
Workers struck while 0/78/20	 0/78/20 B of M/MSh1/UMW - Agree with pro-
handling supplies. jection; U.e extensive iundling
materials time and workforce
required increases congestion in
the work areas.
Struck while installing 0/0/0	 O/0/O 8 of M/MSMA/UMW - Agree with pro-
temporary support. jection; temporary support would
only be placed at the face and the
miner would not be operating at
that time.
i
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Accident Class: Machinery (Continuation 1)
Initial Injury	 Adjustment
Projection	 by 8xperts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI	 F/DI/NDI Reason
Workers caught or struck Less than	 0/516-645/219-438 B of M - Fatalities are generally
while moving or operating 3/1290/438 caused by workers being struck
roc° bolters. by the bolter while moving or
tramming; the bolters on the
tunnel borer are not as massive
and are constrained in their
movement - this would alleviate
fatalities.	 Since the bolting
procedure is simpler, workers have
less variables to worry about;
this would offset the exposure
time and reduce disabling
injuries.
MSHA/UMW - The constrained
movement offsets the increased
exposure time.
Workers struck by other Much less	 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - The removal of
machinery in the area than the conveyor from the working
of the conveyor. 111012 area completely offsets this
hazard.
Workers struck while 0/16/3	 0/8/1 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Workers
riding or getting off generally have better visibility
machinery. of operations with the straight
line layout of equipment.
Struck while setting 0/0/0	 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
brattice projeetioa; task is removed.
i
Struck while supervising. 0/27/5	 0/27/5 B of M/IM/UMW - Concur with
projection; supervisors are often
absorbed in problems and do not
see hazard.
Struck by other machinery 0/0/0	 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/" - Removal of the
while operating shuttle shuttle car is an important
cars. factor.
Struck or caught while * 0/18/19
	
* 0/18/19 B of M/M3HA/UMW - Agree with
operating large drills, tunneling industry data; system
ahoterete machinery, or does not mitigate theme hazards.
hoists.
*Injuries per million manhours.
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Accident Class: Handling Materials
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection by Experts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI F/DI/NDI Reason
Operator or helper struck 0/0/0 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
or pinched moving objects tective measure of remote opera-
out of the way of miner. tion.
Workers drop machine 0/307/169 07307/169 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
components while doing jection.
maintenance.
Workers struck while 0/444/168 0/444/168 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Aree with pro-
handling material and jection; whereas the continuous
handtools during cleanup. miner system will sometimes empluy
r
Workers struck while
	
0/6469/1898 0/3235-6469/
handling supplies and 	 1949-1898
handtools to install
components.
Workers struck handling	 0/2/1	 0/10/7
coal or rock while bar-
ring down loose rock.
Workers injured while	 0/0/0	 010-3410-10
handling power cables.
a scoop to pick up material, the
tunnel borer cleanup must be done
by hand.
B of M - Basically agree with
projection; in actual operation,
this hazard resulted in a lot of
injuries. The use of the hoists
only slightly offset the hazard.
MSHA - The use of the hoists would
help Some, however, the increased
exposure time and manpower would
still keep the injury level well
above the historical level.
UMW - Agree with projection; this
task is extremely hazardous.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Projection is
1^>A; there is still a good chance
of injuring arms or hands.
B of M/UMW - Wor.^era must
still do some minor cable handing
while hanging the power cable
along the rib.
MSHA - Basically agree with
projection; cable handling is
reduced to a minimum.
,=
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0/55/19 0/28-44/10-13
0/0/0 0/0/0
0/24/16 0/24/16
0/10/15 0/10/15
0/0/0
	
0/0/0
Accident Class: Handlins Materials (Continuation 1)
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection	 by gxperts
Hazard/Activity	 F/DI/HDI	 F/DI/MDI	 Reason
Less than	 0/5-27/3-16	 B of M/MSHA - The shoterets
0/54/31	 lining helps prevent rib slough;
still some exposure exists sine
derailments can occur due to floor
heave, or the ramp at the
California switch.
UMW - Some exposure still exists
if the shoterete is not applied
properly, allowing rib slough;
derailments can still occur due to
bumps in the floor.
0/19/3
	
0/19/3	 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
jection; exposure is the sane.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - The use of the
hoist would help reduce exposure
during track laying; track repair
injuries would remain unchanged.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
jection; task removed.
B of M,'MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
jection; exposure is the same.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
jection; exposure is the same.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
projection; tsak removed.
0/43/44
	
0/4-39/4-40	 B of M/UMW - Better ground
control prevents any major
roof falls; some exposure would
exist during accident recovery at
the face.
M.^,HA - Rxposure would only be
marginally reduced; the real
factor is workers being injured
doing non-routine tasks during
accident recovery or supervising.
Workers pinched or struck
moving debris off tracks,
or handling muck after
rerailing cars.
Workers pinched while
handling pins when
coupling rail cars.
Struck while laying
or repairing track.
Workers struck while
installing brattice.
Workers drop materials
while walking or running.
Workers drop drill
sections while drilling
face or rib.
Workers pinched while
moving debris away from
shuttle car.
Struck while supervising
or during accident
recovery.
f
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Accident Class: Explosion/Fire
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection by Experts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI F/DI/NDI Reason
Struck by debris or Less than 0-2/0-3/0-2 B of M/MSHA - Dega31fication
burnt while operating 4/5/4 and constant gas monitoring
miner and roof bolters. offset explosion hazard.
UMW - The degasification measure
is good; but having the gas
monitor twelve feet from the face
could result in not sensing a gas
buildup at the face soon enough.
This increases exposure.
Burnt while doing 1/1/0 2/2/1 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Injuries
maintenance. related to maintenance are
aggravated by the use of flaw. ole
hydraulic fluid and the poor
location of the gas monitor
Burnt while doing weld 0/1/1 0/1/1 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with
repairs. projection; exposure Is the same.
Workers operate rail cars 1/0/1 1/0/1 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Aeree with
or conveyor and sparking projection; same exposure.
causes fire.
Workers struck by debris 1/1/0 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA!UMW - Agree with
while handling materials projection; workers are generally
in face area. handling supplies well outby the
fade area.
B-12
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Accident Class: Electrical
Initial Injury	 Adjustment
Projection	 by Experts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI	 F/DI/NDI Reason
Operator, helper come 0/2/1	 0/1-3/0-1 B of M/UMW - Exposure is reduced
in contact with ener- by firmly attaching electrical
gized conductor while components to the control room
operating miner. skid; this reduces the movement of
cables, which prevents breakage at
the terminals.
MSaA - Exposure is basically the
same; workers must still clean
terminala.
Workers contact energized 2/74/28	 2/67-74/25-28 B of M/MSHA - Agree with
conductor while per- projection; exposure to
forming maintenance. electrical injuries is greater due
to larger amount of maintenance
time.
UMW - Exposure is actually the
same as the continuous miner
system because there are more
cables and power distribution
boxes associated with the
continuous miner.
Workers are moving or Less than
	 0/0-3/0-1 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Removal of
tramming equipment and 1/8/3 cable from the work areas and
contact frayed cable. the layout of equipment reduces
exposure considerably.
Workers contact trolley 0/0/0	 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UM61 - Agree with
wire getting on and projection; trolley wire
off equipment. removed.
Workers contact ener- 0/7/0	 0/2/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Though cleanup
gized cable while time is greater, removal of the
performing cleanup. main power cable from the working
area and reduced cable handling
allows workers to know where
cables are located at all times.
	 j
Workers are handling 2/26/26	 2/26/26 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
metal supplies and projection; the cable can be
contact energized con- damaged by the hoist activities.
ductor; workers contact The greater exposure time and
energized conductor workforce also contribute to
using handtools (not increasing exposure.
maintenance).
B-13
•Accident Class: Electrical (Continuation 1)
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection by Experts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI F/DI/NDI Reason
Workers contact ener- 0/0/0 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with
gized cable while handling projection; equipment layout and
or reeling cable. removal of cable from work areas
minimizes this hazard.
Workers contact ener- 0/16/7 0/16/7 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
gized conductor while projection; exposure is the same.
operating or rerailing
cars.
Workers perform weld
repairs and are shocked
or burnt by arc.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with
projection; exposure is the same.
0/4/1	 0/4/1
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Accident Class: Slip and Fall
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection by Czperta
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI F/DI/NDI Reason
Workers slip and fall 0/12/5 0/12-15/5-6 B of M - There is slightly more
while drilling face or drilling activity with the tunnel
rib, or moving drill. borer system; this stems from the
use of roof bolts, the
dega31fication task, and the
installation of the beam support
brackets.
MSHA /UMW - Agree with projection;
this injury level is typical of
this hazard.
Operator or helper slip 0/1/0 0/1/0 B of M/MSHA /UMW - Agree with
while barring down loose projection; the protection
rock. provided by the canopy helps
prevent most debris from falling
on the work platforms, and the
protection does not require
workers to have to move quickly
out of the way of dislodged,
falling rock.
Slip and fall while Much less 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA /UMW - Agree with
operating miner. 0/11/5 projection; remote operation
removes interaction with the miner.
Slip or fall while 0/334/121 0/284-334/103-121 B of M/UMW - Agree with
moving or operating other projection; there is &lot of
machinery congestion around the hoists;
workers can slip and cause other
workers to fall; the shotcrete and
hoist hazards aggravate the
exposure.
MSHA - Better lighting might
Offset the exposure slightly;
otherwise, agree with projection.
Slip and fall while doing 0/120/32 0/60-120/16-32 B of M/MSHA /UMW - The improved
cleanup. lighting would improve visibility
of obstacles; but exposure is
still greater so one would expect
more injuries than the historical
level.	 Leaking hydraulic fluid
and standing water from the face
spray and shotcrete aggravates
this hazard.
a
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B-15
Accident Class: Slip and Fall (Continuation 1)
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection	 by Experts
Hazard/Activity	 F/DI/NDI	 F/DI/NDI
Slip and fall off	 0/72/24	 0/61-72/20-24
machinery while doing
maintenance.
Slip and fall while 	 0/679/144	 0/679/144
handling awkward
supplies and handtoola
to install components.
Slip and fall while
	
0/0/0	 0/4/1
cable reeling.
Slip and fall while 	 011211	 0/8/1
laying or repairing
track.
Slip and fall while 	 Much leas
	 0/0/0
operating or articulating 	 than
conveyor.	 0/22/6
Reason
B of M/UMW - Agree with pro-
jection; the size of the tunnel
borer, degas drill, and hoists
aggravate falls from an elevation
and offsets the improved lighting.
MSHA - the improved lighting might
reduce exposure slightly;
otherwise, agree with projection.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
jection; the hoist and shot-
creting activities, are very labor
intensive and cause &lot of
congestion; workers can slip and
strike other workers. The hoist
and shoterete hazards also
aggravate slips and falls. The
curved rib also contributes to
this hazard.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - There is a
slight chance of workers slipping
on the curved rib while hanging
the power cable.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - The prefab-
cated track and use of the hoist
removes some of the exposure while
laying track, but does not offset
exposure while repairing track.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Removal of the
conveyor from the working area
offsets this hazard.
B-16
Accident Class: Slip and Fall (Continuation 2)
Initial Injury	 Adjustment
Projection	 by Rxperts
Hazard/Activity F/DI/NDI	 F/DI/NDI Reason
Slip and fall while 0/118/49	 0/94- 118/39-49 B of M/U9M - Agree with projec-
operating locomotive, tion; workers often do not wait
rerailing equipment, for equipment to stop before
getting on or off getting on or off.
equipment, riding MSHA - Though there could still
equipment, or coupling be bumps in the floor due to
cars. floor heave (which can contribute
to derailments), the circilar
entry, shotcrete lining and
improved lighting might
respectively reduce the amount of
debris in the path of the cars and
workers, and give workers better
visibility of obstacles when
getting off machinery.
Slip and fall setting 01210	 0/2/2 B of M/MSHA/UIM - Basically
or removing props. agree with projection; slight
exposure exists if props are
necessary during face maintenance.
Slip and fall while 0/0/0	 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/U4M - Agree with pro-
setting brattice. jection; task removed.
Slip and fall while 0/278/89	 0/209-278/67-89 B of M/MSHA - The equipment
supervising or escaping layout and improved lighting
a hazard. offer more room and better
visibility of operations, and
therefore offset exposure slightly.
U4M - Agree with projection;
supervisors often are absorbed in
task and do not observe presence
of hazard.
B-17
iAo-uident Class: Handtools
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection	 by Experts
Hazard/Activity
	 F/DI/NDI	 F/DI/NDI	 Reason
Struck while widening	 0/0/0	 0/0/0	 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
the entry.	 projection.; task removed.
Struck while barring
down loose rock.
Struck by tool while
doing cleanup.
Tool slips or breaks
while doing maintenance.
Hsndtools slip or break
while being used; mostly
outby support activities.
Handtools slip or break
while being used; mostly
outby support activities.
Struck while laying
or repairing track.
0/1/0	 0/4/2
0/20/16	 0/20/16
0/66/60	 0/66/60
0/1911/2284	 0/600-1911/2284
0/1911/2284	 0/600-1911/2284
0/8/5
	 0/8/5
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Basically
agree with projection; arms and
hands are still slightly exposed
during task which could increase
injuries slightly.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
jection; greater exposure time
increases chance of injury.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
jection; greater exposure time
enhances accident probability.
B of M/MSHA - Agree with pro-
jection; the combination of
outby support and the beam and
flexicore activities greatly
increase the chance of being
injured.
UMW - Agree with the nondisabling
injury projection; the disabling
injury projection would still be
higher than the historical level
due to the labor intensiveness of
the beam and flexicore
activities. However, the
continuous miner room and pillar
operation often employs several
2-3 man crews doing outby support
work in the crosscuts. This would
tend to bring the comparative
manhours and workforce ratios
closer together and therefore
reduce injuries sa
B of M/MSHA/UMW - ,
section; exposure :
B-18
Accident Class: Nandtools (Continuation 1)
Hazard/Activity
Initial Injury
Projection
E/DI/NDI
Adjustment
by Experts
!/DI/NDI Reason
Tool slips while 0/68/42 0/68/42 B of M/MSHA/UMM - Concur with
handling supplies. projection; tunnel borer system
would probably use carrying
slings, tongs, clamps, etc. to a
greater extent than the continuous
miner system.	 The larger
workforce and manhours also
increase exposure.
Struck while coupling 0/17/8 0/17/8 B of M/MSMA/UMW - Agree with pro-
ears or rerailing cars. section; exposure is the same.
Struck while tightening 0/35/46 0/35/46 8 of M/MSHA/UMM - Concur with
drills. projection; sore drill activity
exists with the tunnel borer
system.
Tool slips or breaks 0/3/2 0/3/2 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
while setting props or section; task is reduced
timber. considerably, thereby reducing
exposure.
Struck while setting 0/0/0 0/0/0 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
brattice. section; task removed.
Tool slips while 0/0/1 0/0/1 8 of M/MSHA/UMW - Concur with
adjusting conveyar. projection; exposure is the same.
Supervisor struck 0/4/4 0/4/4 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
by tool ,section; supervisors usually work
closely with workers during
handtool operations (such as
maintenance).
B-19
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Aocident Class: Pressure Release
Initial Injury Adjustment
Projection by Experts
Hazard/Activity F /DI/NDI F /DI/NDI Reason
Struck by whipping 0/3/1 0/3-6/1-2 B of M/MSHA/UMW - The tunnel
hydraulic line while borer system is larger than the
doing maintenance. continuous miner system and
therefore employs more hydraulics
and pneumatics.	 This would tend
to aggravate the maintenance time
factor to an even greater extent.
Struck by pressure 0/0/1 0/0/1 B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with pro-
release from failed section; exposure is the same.
r
hydraulic ,hacks.
S1.ruck by pneumatic	 a 0/6/0	 a 0/6/0
lines or fittings while
operating equipment.
*Injuries per million manhours.
B of M/MSHA/UMW - Agree with
tunneling industry experience;
exposure is the same.
B-20
